Election of Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law: Doorway into the Legal Hall of Mirrors by Belt, David C.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 1
1995
Election of Remedies in Employment
Discrimination Law: Doorway into the Legal Hall
of Mirrors
David C. Belt
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David C. Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law: Doorway into the Legal Hall of Mirrors, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
145 (1995)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol46/iss1/5
NOTES
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIINATION LAW: DOORWAY INTO THE LEGAL
HALL OF MIRRORS
INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law, most would argue, is in a
state of crisis. Since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,' the number of discrimination claims has risen dra-
matically. Meanwhile, the administrative agency charged with en-
forcing compliance with these laws, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC),2 has, by most accounts, failed in its
efforts to investigate charges of discrimination,3 as evidenced by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Basically, Title VII
makes it illegal for an employer to fail to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate
against an employee or applicant "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Although the protected groups remain the same
throughout the statute, the types of discrimination covered are broad and varied. See id.
§§ 2000e-1 and -2 for the full text of types of discrimination covered by Title VII.
2. Id. § 2000e-4 (establishing the EEOC); id. § 2000e-5 (establishing the EEOC's
powers and duties with respect to preventing employment discrimination). The EEOC's
general responsibilities upon receiving a claim include conducting an initial investigation
into whether there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred. A deci-
sion on reasonable cause should be made, where practicable, within 120 days from receiv-
ing the charge. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC believes that no good cause exists, it must
dismiss the claim and notify the claimant. Id. If the EEOC believes that good cause ex-
ists, it must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice informally. Id. If that is un-
successful, it shall bring a civil action. Id. § 2000e-5(f(l). If the EEOC does not either
dismiss the charge, enter into a conciliation agreement with the employer, or file a court
action within 180 days, the claimant may request a right to sue letter and bring his or
her own action within 90 days of receiving the letter. Id.
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress Discrimination in
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its 110,000 case backlog as of August 1995.' Consequently, the
EEOC has had to abrogate much of its "filtering" responsibility to
the court system, which is, as a result, overburdened with discrimi-
nation claims.'
Out of this situation has arisen a series of proposals for re-
form. The most recent and notable reform proposal is that of the
Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of
the United States,6 in a report drafted in November of 1994 and
submitted to the Judicial Conference in March of 1995. In the
report, the Committee recommends requiring the EEOC "to conduct
a more thorough review" and, "where possible, [to] resolve dis-
putes before they ever reach a federal court,"7 to have Congress
empower agencies-presumably including the EEOC-to adjudicate
claims,' and to restrict judicial review of administrative decisions.9
Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title VII?, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 93, 100 n.50
(1985) (stating that although the administrative process was designed to be a speedier
alternative to litigation, the EEOC's massive backlog usually prevents it from commencing
investigations within its statutorily-defined 180-day period); Peter T. Kilbom, Backlog of
Cases is Overwhelming Jobs-Bias Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, at 1 (noting that
complaints filed with the EEOC remain uninvestigated an average of 19 months, compared
with eight months in 1990). EEOC Chairman Gilbert F. Casellas has recognized the per-
ceived failure of the agency, stating that "[tihe agency has essentially lost credibility with
the public." Id.
4. Peter Eisler, Waiting for Justice: Complainants Now Sit for at Least a Year, USA
TODAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at 1A (reporting a backlog of 110,131 cases); Carol Kleiman, Job
Bias is Still Rampant, Blatant, EEOC Chief Says, Cm. TRIB., July 30, 1995, § 3 (Jobs) at
I (reporting a backlog of 108,106). The 110,000 case backlog is up from the estimated
96,945 case backlog at the end of fiscal year 1994, which itself is more than double the
number of pending claims the EEOC had not resolved by the end of fiscal year 1991.
Hillary Durgin, Labor Mediation Project Eases Agency's Load, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 27,
1994 (Business), at 1.
5. Peter Eisler, Overloaded System Tests New Strategies, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 1995,
at 10A (reporting that the number of employment discrimination cases filed in federal
court increased 109% between 1990 and 1994). See infra note 42 and accompanying text
(noting the rise of employment discrimination claims compared to that of all civil claims).
6. COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (March 1995)
[hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE ,PLAN]. The November 1994 draft is substantially
similar to the March 1995 document, with some important differences. See COMMITEE ON
LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (November 1994) [hereinafter PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN (1994 draft)]; see also infra notes 173-74 (discussing the dif-
ferences between the two documents).
7. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 6, at 33.
8. Id. at 33-34. This proposal is not new, however. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMrrrEE, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 49-50 (1989) (recom-
mending that Congress authorize the EEOC to adjudicate wrongful discharge cases on a
trial basis, thereby reducing the burden on federal courts). In addition, many states have
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Another prominent reform proposal analyzed by many commenta-
tors'" encourages employers and employees to submit all employ-
ment-related disputes, including charges of discrimination, to bind-
ing arbitration, thus taking the cases out of the administrative and
judicial systems entirely. These types of proposals are designed
primarily to streamline the adjudication process and to alleviate the
burden imposed on the EEOC and the federal court system. 2
Largely overlooked in all of this discussion is a system,
grounded entirely in procedural reform, already in place in a mi-
nority of states:'3 the principle of forcing discrimination complain-
ants to choose between pursuing their claims through the adminis-
trative process and the judicial system. 4 Like the above proposals,
this election of remedies concept is designed to streamline the
adjudication process and to remove at least some of the burdens
imposed on courts and state fair employment practices (FEP) agen-
cies 5 alike. 6 The central assumption underlying this approach is
empowered their own fair employment practices agencies to adjudicate discrimination
claims. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing states requiring complete
exhaustion of state administrative remedies, with some appellate court review); infra note
97 and accompanying text (discussing states requiring an election of remedies, thus allow-
ing the state administrative agency to adjudicate claims filed by those who have "elected"
to pursue an administrative remedy).
9. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 6, at 44-45.
10. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
45 RuTrGERS L. REv. 921, 959-62 (1993) (recognizing the benefits of alternative dispute
resolution while also noting a potential conflict with the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial if employment arbitration becomes mandatory); Mark Berger, Can Employment
Law Arbitration Work?, 61 U.M.K.C L. REv. 693, 713-20 (1993) (recommending the use
of arbitration, with caution). See generally infra notes 146-49 (providing additional com-
mentary on the use of arbitration).
11. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (distinguishing election of remedies from
arbitration on these grounds).
12. See Belton, supra note 10, at 959 (stating that employers favor the use of arbitra-
tion and other forms of alternative dispute resolution in part due to its lower cost and en-
hanced efficiency compared to court litigation).
13. See infra note 97 (referring to states with election of remedies provisions).
14. As an illustration of how much the concept of election of remedies has been over-
looked, see, for example, MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EM-
PLOYtmwr DisCRIMIATION 979-82, 984-86 (1994), which devoted only seven of its 1310
pages to issues related to election of remedies, four to the preclusive effects of arbitration,
and three to the application of res judicata to prior state agency determinations. See also
infra note 146 (noting the dominance of arbitration analysis even in commentary on elec-
tion of remedies).
15. State FEP agencies are similar to the EEOC in that they investigate charges under
discrimination laws. FEP agencies differ, however, in that they investigate claims arising
both under state law (pursuant to the individual state's statute) and federal law (as a
"deferral" agency for the EEOC). See infra notes 92-99 (discussing the role of FEP agen-
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that a claimant will weigh the associated costs, available remedies,
speed of disposition, procedural hurdles, and other considerations
such as limitations periods, and will choose the path best suited to
his or her type of claim under the specific circumstances. 7 As a
result, unlike the system currently in place at the federal level and
in most states, where both the administrative agency and court
system could potentially hear a particular claim, the plaintiff in the
election of remedies system will appear before only one body. 8
Briefly, it would be useful to illustrate how a typical election
of remedies system functions. Suppose an Ohio resident alleges age
discrimination in employment under state law. He or she has, in
addition to any possible common law contract or tort claims, 19
four statutory antidiscrimination provisions in the Ohio Revised
Code under which to assert a right to recover." One of these pro-
visions is purely an administrative remedy, in that it authorizes the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) to assert a claim, but con-
eies in Title VII actions and the broad state-by-state differences among these agencies'
jurisdictions).
16. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (setting forth the general policy
justifications for the concept of election of remedies).
17. A fundamental problem with this formulation, among others, is that complainants,
at the time when the crucial decision has to be made, have little or no available informa-
tion on which to base this decision. See infra notes 74, 111-14 and accompanying text
(discussing the unfairness to pro se litigants caused by election of remedies).
18. A complainant in an election of remedies state who elects the administrative path
does, however, have an opportunity to appeal a negative finding by the state agency to
the state's court system. E.g., N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 298 (McKinney 1993); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112.06 (Baldwin 1994). But see infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text
(discussing why a claimant should not appeal a negative state agency finding).
19. Generally, the full range of contract-based claims is available to any employee who
is not employed at-will. Tort claims, such as those alleging infliction of emotional dis-
tress, are available to all employees. Title VII, as well as most other employment
antidiscrimination statutes, is aimed at providing a remedy to employees in areas not
covered by the common law, and was never intended to supplant the common law. See
Andrea Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction Un-
der Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 782 (1983) (noting the
alternatives available to a victim of discrimination).
20. See OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Baldwin 1994) (prohibiting employers from
discriminating "in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause
any employee aged forty or older," and providing for a civil cause of action under the
section); id. § 4112.02 (in language very similar to Title VII, prohibiting any employer
from engaging in a wide variety of discriminatory practices "because of the race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry of any person," and allowing a
civil cause of action); id. § 4112.05 (establishing the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
(OCRC), and allowing all persons to file a charge with it claiming that someone has
violated § 4112.02); id. § 4112.99 ("whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil
action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.").
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fers no private right of action' The other three provisions, two
specifically prohibiting age discrimination 2 and one simply pro-
viding a remedy for any violations of the statute,' confer a pri-
vate right of action in the state courts without having to resort to
any initial procedural steps through the state agency. Three of the
four provisions expressly state that they are exclusive from the
others,24 and the other has been ruled by an Ohio appellate court
as implicitly providing exclusivity.'
The idea of forcing discrimination complainants to elect be-
tween a remedy provided by the administrative system and one
provided by the judicial system seems at first to be a perfect,
albeit unimaginative, way to streamline the process. A closer analy-
sis reveals, however, that election of remedies not only fails to
have a considerable effect on the speed of adjudication,' but also
is contrary to a system which, if operating correctly, is specifically
designed to speed adjudication. In addition, election of remedies
has already produced some anomalous results28 and has served to
21. Id. § 4112.05(N).
22. Id. §§ 4101.17, 4112.02.
23. Id. § 4112.99.
24. E.g., id. § 4112.02(N) ("A person who files a civil action under this division is
barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under
section 4101.17 of the Revised Code and from filing a charge with the [OCRC] under
section 4112.05 of the Revised Code."); see also id. §§ 4101.17, 4112.05 (containing
parallel provisions).
25. See Balent v. National Revenue Corp., 638 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App.)
(holding that, due to the "specific and detailed articulation of available remedies and
interaction between applicable statutes addressing age discrimination claims," the filing of
an age discrimination claim under § 4112.99 constitutes an election of remedies), appeal
denied, 637 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 1994).
26. For example, between 1972 and 1989, the EEOC brought less than 4% of all
employment discrimination claims to federal courts. John J. Donohue I & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 983, 1000 n.66 (1991). While this figure does not seem to lead to the conclusion
that election of remedies would streamline adjudication, it reveals that the overwhelming
majority of employment discrimination claimants either have their complaints dismissed,
thus enabling them to sue in court, or do not wait for the administrative procedure to run
its course, preferring to bring a private action instead. See Kilbom, supra note 3, at 1, 10
(noting that about 60% of claims are rejected by the EEOC as showing insufficient evi-
dence of discrimination, and 25% are closed, usually because the claimant withdraws the
complaint, and that only about 3% of cases are put into suit by the agency). The above
statistics suggest that it would be beneficial for most plaintiffs to avoid the agency and
go straight to court. The practical effect would be to overburden the courts to a much
greater degree.
27. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that a goal of spreading agency
authority is the speedier resolution of claims).
28. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistency in adjudi-
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further complicate an already tangled procedural framework. Ulti-
mately, this Note argues that the election of remedies scheme in
this context runs contrary both to the theory of employment dis-
crimination law generally and to its own desired effects of stream-
lining procedures while preserving the autonomy of a complainant.
Although the need for a practical solution to overburdening the
judicial and administrative systems is one of the most pressing
concerns facing both the federal and state legislatures today, it may
be that the first steps toward that solution are neither as sweeping
nor as complicated as one might imagine.
To these ends, this Note is divided into four parts. Each is
aimed at analyzing a different aspect of the employment discrimi-
nation crisis. These sections help to explain why an election of
remedies system-or any other system that attempts to drive a
wedge between courts and administrative agencies-is both an ap-
parently attractive option and a misguided patchwork solution that
causes more problems than it solves.29
Part I is a brief general overview of the current employment
discrimination crisis, focusing on its scope and its causes. It is
important to discuss these at the outset: first, to show that the
crisis is multi-faceted and thus not easily nor immediately solvable;
second, to explain why it is so important that alternatives are ex-
plored.
Part II looks specifically at the problems a complainant alleg-
ing employment discrimination faces when bringing a charge, and
the procedural hurdles she or he must overcome at both the federal
and state levels. Although most commentators and practitioners
note that the web of procedures is exceedingly complex," there
cation under this system).
29. It should be pointed out, however, that an analysis of the concept of election of
remedies is not the main purpose of this Note, but rather a window through which to
examine the current disarray of the procedural framework in place to vindicate rights
under substantive employment discrimination law. Thus, this Note is both broader and
narrower than it may appear. It is broader because the concept of election of remedies is
primarily an oft-overlooked point of departure through which to reassess how employment
discrimination law should work and is working. It is narrower because this Note focuses
almost entirely on the procedural aspects of employment discrimination law rather than on
substantive law. Additionally, this Note looks primarily at Title VII claims between private
parties because Title VII claims account for 80% of all employment civil rights cases.
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 985 n.3.
30. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 3, at 99 (arguing that the "Title VII administrative
process has become a long and difficult maze"). The perceived complexity of employment
discrimination procedure provides an auxiliary purpose for this Note: assisting a practition-
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has been relatively little commentary on why this is so and wheth-
er the procedures themselves exacerbate large-scale problems in
employment discrimination law. In addition, a general look at
procedure explains how and where the concept of election of reme-
dies fits. It also sheds some light on why, at least initially, election
of remedies seems to be a viable though incomplete solution to the
flooded administrative and judicial systems.
Part III focuses more directly on the concept of election of
remedies in the context of the theoretical underpinnings of employ-
ment discrimination law, ultimately demonstrating why the concept
is contrary to the purposes of employment discrimination law in
theory. Also, a look at election of remedies in practice reveals
some of the anomalous results stemming from forcing a complain-
ant to choose between pursuing a judicial and an administrative
remedy. Finally, this section looks at arbitration, another type of
scheme that can also be referred to as one contemplating an elec-
tion of remedies. Indeed, the limited commentary on election of
remedies in the employment context has referred primarily to arbi-
tration. This section discusses the role of the election of arbitration
in employment discrimination litigation and explains why this sys-
tem, although not without its own flaws, is fundamentally different
from the scheme that is the focus of this Note.
Part IV weighs some of the competing considerations for
dealing with the employment discrimination crisis, focusing particu-
larly on the Long Range Planning Committee's proposal. Although
the attempt is not to formulate a definitive solution, a look at some
of the competing considerations reveals some of the inherent weak-
nesses of past and current reform proposals, and indicates both that
the solution is not immediately forthcoming and that it may not be
as fundamental as it seems. In short, this Note argues that the first,
albeit painful, step toward a solution is to define the role of the
EEOC and provide the perennially under-funded agency with suffi-
cient funding to carry out its 1964 Civil Rights Act mandate.
er who may not be familiar with the procedural complexities of this system and outlining
the types of procedural problems that may arise.
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PART I: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CRISIS
Although there is almost universal approval of having employ-
ment discrimination laws,3" and there have almost undeniably been
some positive results from these laws,32 most commentators have
agreed that the system for vindicating individual rights in the em-
ployment context is currently in a state of disarray,33 or at least
that employment discrimination laws are not as effective as they
once were.34 Certainly, even a brief look at the statistics reveals
an escalating trend in employment discrimination claims, which
have flooded the administrative and judicial systems charged with
adjudicating those claims. This alarming situation has provoked
many commentators to look for the causes. The net result of the
research is a staggeringly complex web of causes and concerns
with no obvious solutions.
31. As early as 1968, a study showed that 83% of whites favored "laws that make
white people hire qualified Negroes." John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in
Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1598 n.64 (1992).
But compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 20-77 (1992) (arguing, based on an economic analysis, that
regulated employment markets are an overall social evil, that some discrimination in em-
ployment is rational, and that any irrational discrimination will ultimately be corrected by
the market) and Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70
TEX. L. REV. 1219 (1992) (book review) (tentatively supporting Epstein's arguments) with
Nancy E. Dowd, Liberty vs. Equality: In Defense of Privileged White Males, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 429 (1993) (book review) (responding negatively to Epstein).
32. For example, there has been a decline in the type of overt, blanket exclusions of
certain categories of people from jobs that existed at the time Title VII was enacted. Cf.
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1015 (noting that there has been a major shift
from "fail to hire" cases to termination cases); id. at 1019 (noting that the decline of
class action discrimination suits is in part attributable to the elimination of gross, sweep-
ing violations of the law).
33. See, e.g., Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-
Law Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 5 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 35, 38-39 (arguing
that "relief under Title VII is either unavailable or ineffective in a variety of employment
discrimination cases," pointing specifically to lengthy administrative procedures and the
large EEOC case backlog as two major causes).
34. See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1032-33 (arguing that employ-
ment discrimination policy used to be more effective than it is now, due to four factors:
the decline in flagrant and obvious violations of the law, the consequent decline in the
possibility of the class action suit, the shift from failure to hire cases to discriminatory
firing cases, and the existence of programs such as affirmative action). See generally EP-
STEIN, supra note 31 (arguing that Title VII is no longer necessary because state and
local governments no longer practice de jure segregation nor permit private violence).
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A. A Brief Look at the Numbers
The statistics certainly provide evidence of a system that can-
not handle the sudden explosion of employment discrimination
cases in both the administrative and judicial systems. The EEOC,
the body charged with policing Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA)," and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA),36 is inundated with claims. From 1991 to 1994
alone, the number of employment discrimination charges filed with
the EEOC grew by 50%,7 resulting in a backlog of cases that
rose from approximately 42,000 in 199038 to 110,000 in 1995?9
While EEOC complaints have grown dramatically, the agency's
staffing levels and budget have remained almost static for the last
decade.' Consequently, even if no more employment discrimina-
tion charges are filed within the next nineteen months, it would
take the EEOC the entire time just to sort through its pending
claims. State agencies have reported similar problems.4'
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The ADEA prohibits discrimination
in precisely the same manner as Title VII, but applies to age only. Id. § 622. The ADEA
fell within the jurisdiction of the EEOC in 1978. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26,
at 1018 n.109.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). A broad-based antidiscrimination stat-
ute, the ADA's employment discrimination provision is similar to Title Vil's prohibition.
Compare id. § 12112 with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (noting parallels between the ADA's
definition of discrimination and Title VII's definition of unlawful employment practices).
The EEOC's enforcement powers were conferred by direct reference to the relevant provi-
sions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
37. In fiscal 1994, 95,447 claims were filed with the EEOC, compared with 67,509
claims filed in fiscal 1991. Janet Novack, Silver Lining, FORBEs, Nov. 21, 1994, at 124,
124.
38. See 232 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-7 (Dec. 2, 1992) (reporting a pending
caseload of 42,000 suits in 1990, 46,000 in 1991, and 52,856 in 1992).
39. See supra note 4 (noting an EEOC estimate of 96,945 pending cases at the end of
fiscal 1994 and an estimated 110,000 case backlog in the summer of 1995).
40. See 32 Gov. EMP. REL. REP. (BNA), at 1326 (Oct. 31, 1994) (noting that the
EEOC has stayed at a relatively constant staffing level of about 3000 since 1984); Jorge
Aquino, EEOC: Too Many Cases, Too Little Leadership, RECORDER, June 6, 1994, at 15
(stating that the EEOC's budget has been static since 1985); Eisler, supra note 5, at 10A
(reporting that the number of EEOC investigators dropped 12.6% between 1989 and
1994). One consequence of this is that the EEOC has had to dismiss a growing number
of charges, thus allowing a growing number of complainants to file claims in federal
court. Aquino, supra, at 15 (EEOC dismissed 88% of charges filed in 1992).
41. See Associated Press, Discrimination Agencies Face Growing Caseloads. Increase
in Successes Only Brings More Work, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), July 10, 1994,
at 3A (reporting the increase in state filings). For example, the Massachusetts commission
has received twice as many complaints as it had in 1990, the filings with the Pennsylva-
nia Human Relations Commission have grown by over 250% from 1978 to 1993,
California's commission has received over 160% more filings in 1994 than it received in
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The court system has also had considerable growth in discrim-
ination cases. While the volume of all federal civil case filings rose
by 125% from 1970 to 1989, the employment discrimination case-
load rose by over 2,000% during that time.42 If the number of
employment discrimination cases were to continue to rise at this
rate, there would be one suit for every currently employed worker
by the year 2053.43 Although the rate of increase will undoubtedly
fall, the overall increase in the number of civil filings in the feder-
al system has led the Judicial Conference's Long Range Planning
Committee to estimate that by the year 2020, there will need to be
a 500% increase in federal judgeships to keep up with overall
caseload growth.' With employment discrimination claims ac-
counting for a large and increasing percentage of that overall
growth, the search for causes and solutions has become increasing-
ly acute.
B. The Search for Causes
Although there has been much commentary, especially in the
last five years, on the causes of this explosion in discrimination
claims, there has been no consensus. While a detailed evaluation of
the competing theories is beyond the scope of this Note,45 it is
1990, and Rhode Island's commission has its biggest backlog of cases in its 45-year
history. Id.
Generally, the complaints aimed at the EEOC's lack of effectiveness have been ap-
plied with equal force to state FEP agencies. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 33, at 43
("[Sitate budgetary constraints generally leave state agencies with staffs and resources that
are even more limited than on the federal level, causing additional delays and frustration
in resolving complaints."); Kim Clark, Md. Budget Cuts Delay Job Bias Probes: HRC's
Effectiveness is Questioned, THE BALTIMORE SUN, April 6, 1993, at 15C (reporting that
budget cuts to the Maryland Human Relations Commission "have resulted in delays that
are so long that many have begun questioning whether it can effectively protect the rights
of workers"); Bill Sanderson & Ovetta Wiggins, N.J. Civil Rights Agency in Crisis: Staff
Dwindles as Cases Climb, THE RECORD (Hackensack, NJ.), Aug. 27, 1995, at Al (report-
ing that the case backlog and staffing cuts have weakened the New Jersey FEP agency's
effectiveness).
42. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 985.
43. Id. at 1021. Donohue and Siegelman note, however, that it would be an "absurdi-
ty" to suppose that the number of discrimination cases will continue to rise at that level.
Id.
44. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 6, at 15. The Committee estimates that,
based on current trends, the number of federal district and appellate judgeships, which has
risen from 289 in 1950 to 816 in 1994, will rise to 4120 by the year 2020. Id. This
rise is even more dramatic than the Committee's projections in its November 1994 draft,
where the Committee estimated that the number of federal judgeships would be 4013 by
the year 2020, indicating that the federal caseload has risen steeply even in the last two
years. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN (1994 Draft), supra note 6, at 13.
45. For an article that does provide in-depth analysis, see generally Donohue &
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worth pointing out some of the more agreed-upon factors that have
led to and exacerbated the current crisis. At the very least, a look
at the wide range of contributing factors indicates that there is no
simple solution to the problem.
One major cause of the increased numbers of complainants is
the expansion of coverage in the substantive laws. Legislatures and
courts at both the federal and state level have dramatically in-
creased the percentage of the work force covered since the passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The impact of federal legislation
cannot be understated. In the three decades since Title VII's pas-
sage, Congress's two major post-Title VII antidiscrimination stat-
utes, the ADEA (enacted in 1967) 4 and the ADA (enacted in
1990),4' have expanded the protection afforded by employment
discrimination laws.' In addition to new types of protection, Con-
gress has expanded existing protection through amending Title VII
in 1972" and 1991,50 and the ADEA on multiple occasions.5'
Siegelman, supra note 26, at 983-1021, which employs a detailed statistical analysis to
uncover the root causes of both the growth and changing nature of employment discrimi-
nation litigation, and concludes that the two primary causes of the growth are the increase
in the unemployment rate and the percentage of the work force protected by employment
discrimination laws.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (originally enacted as Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)). Claims arising under the ADEA
have consistently accounted for about 18% of the EEOC's annual volume of charges since
1980. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1018.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. In 1993, the Act's first full year of implementation,
88,000 claims were filed, up from 72,000 in 1992. Aquino, supra note 40, at 15.
48. The Judicial Conference's Long Range Planning Committee highlighted the ADEA
and ADA as two of the 11 "key examples" of congressional legislation that have "con-
tributed to an enormous expansion of private rights of action," and, consequently, to a
tremendous expansion of federal court jurisdiction. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN (1994
Draft), supra note 6, at 30.
49. The 1972 Amendments, as well as expanding the EEOC's power to enforce Title
VII, expanded the statute's coverage to include employers that have between 15 and 25
employees, state and local government employers, and educational institution employers.
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 998; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a),
2000e*b).
50. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which passed after heated debate, expanded reme-
dies available under Title VII to include compensatory and punitive damages in cases of
intentional discrimination, injunctive and declaratory relief in "mixed motive" cases, and
"expert fees" in awards for attorney's fees generally. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988c
(Supp. V 1993). This Act has been the focus of much recent criticism by commentators.
See infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text (discussing the 1991 Act).
51. The ADEA's changes have primarily involved broader definitions of what ages are
included in its protection. As originally enacted, the ADEA protected employees between
the ages of 40 and 65, who work in places employing 50 or more workers. Now it cov-
ers all employees 40 and older working at places with 20 or more workers. 29 U.S.C.
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Congress also expanded the ADA's coverage in 199452 and ex-
tended the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 beyond the formation of
contracts. 3 As a result of all of these changes in coverage, over
seventy percent of the total labor force is protected both by federal
employment discrimination law and by EEOC enforcement.54 State
legislation has also increased since 1964. While only half the states
had comprehensive fair employment practices laws at the time of
Title VII's enactment, forty-nine states now have such legisla-
tion.55 Much of the current state legislation is broader in coverage
than federal legislation.56
Of course, Congress and the state legislatures are not alone in
expanding the scope and coverage of employment discrimination
laws in the last three decades. The Supreme Court has expanded
the coverage of Title VII to reach "reverse discrimination"" and
"disparate impact" discrimination," to protect pregnancy leave, 9
§§ 630(b) (providing employer limits), 631(a) (providing age limits).
52. As of July 1994, the ADA covers work places with 15 or more employees, which
is down from 25 at the time of enactment. A provision expanding the work places cov-
ered was written into the original act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (allowing a two-year
grace period before expanding coverage to include more work places). The ADA became
effective in July, 1992. Id. § 12111 (References in text).
53. A Reconstruction-era statute, § 1981 did not originally confer any rights that were
not already found in the Constitution, rather it protects all persons' equal rights "to make
and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination only, has no administrative
prerequisites, and allows for unlimited compensatory damages. Id. It was amended in the
1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1981a (Supp. V 1993)), which expanded the "make and enforce contracts"
language to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts,
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
54. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 992 n.18.
55. Catania, supra note 19, at 782 n.24. Alabama is the one state without any compre-
hensive antidiscrimination laws. Id.
56. For example, 24 states prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status, while
a smaller but growing number of states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, two areas left unprotected by Congress. See 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
451:101-08 (providing state-by-state charts of the types of discrimination prohibited).
57. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976) (holding
that Title VII also protects whites against discrimination because of their race).
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (noting that whites score
"far better" on the company tests, and that this disparity is attributable to race). Disparate
impact discrimination claims, basically, "involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory
motive ...is not required under a disparate-impact theory." International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977) (citation omitted).
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and to prohibit sexual harassment.' And, even in situations where
the Supreme Court has attempted to scale back the rights protected
under Title VII, Congress has amended the statute to reassert those
rights.6
1
In addition to the changes in the scope of statutory coverage,
commentators have pointed to a myriad of other internal and exter-
nal factors that have helped cause the explosion of litigation and
administrative filings. These include causes such as the rising un-
employment rate,62 expansion of available remedies, 3 presidential
hostility toward the EEOC, 4 expansion of the EEOC's powers in
1972,' and the shift from failure to hire cases to wrongful termi-
Shortly after Griggs, Congress amended Title VII to include a disparate impact theo-
ry. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 80 Stat. 662 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections in
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
59. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1977) (holding that women
are to receive sick pay and retain seniority while on pregnancy leave). This protection
was expanded and codified in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1988) ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.").
60. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that sex discrimi-
nation via a "hostile environment" claim is actionable under Title VII). Despite the recog-
nition of the claim, it was not until the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and its
allowance of compensatory and punitive damages, that victims of sexual harassment had
an effective remedy. See Donohue, supra note 31, at 1610-11. The result of this was an
explosion of sexual harassment claims in the early 1990s. See Durgin, supra note 4, at 1
(noting the heightened public awareness because of Anita Hill's accusations during the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings).
61. Donohue, supra note 31, at 1612. For example, the Supreme Court restricted
§ 1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989). Congress re-
sponded by adding paragraph (b) to § 1981. See supra note 53 (quoting from the provi-
sion of § 1981(b), expressly overruling Patterson).
62. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 999 ("When unemployment rates are low
and labor markets are tight, workers probably encounter less discrimination and are cer-
tainly better positioned to seek remedies outside the litigation process for any discrimi-
nation they do encounter." (citation omitted)).
63. For example, many commentators have argued that the allowance of compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as jury trials, under the 1991 Civil Rights Act will create
a huge explosion in federal litigation. See infra notes 135-38. But see Shapiro, supra note
3, at 101 n.56 (arguing that since there are still caps on damages available under the
1991 Act, plaintiffs are still likely to bring state claims in states that do allow unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages).
64. Due to presidential hostility toward the EEOC and the resulting budgetary restraints
placed on the agency, many plaintiffs elect to litigate their claims rather than pursue ad-
ministrative relief. See generally KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII
AcTIoNS § 8.15, at 301 (1994) (arguing that it will be difficult to change the Reagan and
Bush EEOC appointees' "deep-seated hostility to charging parties"); Frank Greve, New
EEOC Chief Steps Up Bias Fight, TIMES-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 27, 1994, at A12
(noting that Presidents Reagan and Bush named EEOC commissioners who were hostile to
civil rights groups, and that Congress responded by slashing the EEOC's budget).
65. Before 1972, the EEOC was given only conciliatory powers, and was dubbed a
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nation cases.' Since compelling arguments and statistical evidence
have been offered in support of most of these potential causes, and
since there has been no consensus on the cause of the current
overload of cases, it is safe to conclude that the causes of the em-
ployment discrimination crisis are varied and complex.
PART II: THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURE
"The combination of increasing employee rights coupled with
an overloaded legal system . . . indicates that alternatives to the
current process must be seriously considered."'67 According to one
commentator,
The existence of various federal and state remedies for
employment discrimination poses numerous problems with
regard to devising a judicial process that will work effi-
ciently and fairly to adjudicate one's rights under all the
available remedies. These problems are compounded be-
"toothless tiger." Belton, supra note 10, at 957 (borrowing the term from ALFRED W.
BLUMROSEN, BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 59 (1971)). In 1972, Congress au-
thorized the EEOC to bring suits and seek judicial enforcement of Title VII. Id. Some
commentators have stated that this power is one of the major causes of increased employ-
ment discrimination litigation. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY CoMMISSION, REPLY
TO THE PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURT STUDY COMMISSION 3
(1990), quoted in Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1000 n.65 (arguing that in-
creased litigation is caused by two major factors-additional private rights of action and
the litigation authority given to the EEOC in the 1972 amendments); cf. Neal Devins, The
Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1735 (1991) (book review) ("The 1972
amendments, among other things, endorsed the judicial enforcement model."). But see
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 998, 1000 n.66 (arguing that the EEOC played
an "essentially passive role" in the growth of discrimination litigation since it brought less
that 4% of employment discrimination cases between 1969 and 1989).
66. Ironically, it has been argued that the shift to wrongful termination cases was
caused by the success of employment discrimination law in "[t]he attainment of better and
more integrated jobs for minorities." Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1014-15.
Donohue and Siegelman point out that, while hiring charges outnumbered firing charges
by 50% in 1966, firing charges outnumbered hiring charges by nearly 300% in 1985. Id.
at 1015. This has led to an increase in overall Title VII litigation because, even if the
number of instances of discrimination in hiring and discrimination in firing are roughly
equal, the "probability of being sued for the latter violation is roughly six times as great."
Id. at 1017 n.107. The authors attribute this increased likelihood to sue in part to the fact
that discrimination in firing is easier to detect and to prove: minorities and women can
more easily compare their performance to their co-workers. Id. at 1012; see also Ronald
Turner, A Look at Title VIll's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 219, 239-40
(1994) (explaining that a current employee might be more reluctant to sue an employer,
in part due to fear of retaliation or desire not to strain the ongoing employment relation-
ship).
67. Berger, supra note 10, at 696.
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cause the various causes of action are diverse with respect
to the substantive rights they accord, the procedures they
create, and the remedial schemes they establish.68
The procedural framework in employment discrimination law, im-
plemented when there were fewer claims and fewer substantive
rights, is perhaps no longer the most fair and efficient framework.
Due to increasing numbers of claims, brought about in large part
by an increase in substantive rights, the procedural system to en-
force those rights has been rendered "a long and difficult maze,
hiding many obstacles."69 Thus, the procedural maze of statutes
such as Title VII is, arguably, both a consequence of and a con-
tributing factor to the massive growth in employment discrimina-
tion litigation.
Before turning to possible alternatives to the existing system,
however, it is important to examine the procedure as it exists now,
for at least three reasons: (1) to appreciate why the system is not
designed to and cannot' handle the explosion in discrimination
claims; (2) to put reform proposals in context; and (3) to under-
stand how and where the concept of election of remedies fits. The
following analysis looks specifically at the Title VII procedural
scheme, primarily because it is procedurally the most complicated
of all the antidiscrimination laws7" and because Title VII claims
account for eighty percent of all employment discrimination claims
filed in U.S. courts.7' However, some of the major variances
among different statutory schemes are also noted.
A. The Rationale for the Title VII Procedural System.
The procedural framework implemented by Title VII is a multi-
layered structure that seems to revolve around a few interrelated,
although often contradictory, guiding principles. The first principle
is that authority should not be centralized and that there be coop-
eration both between the federal and state levels, and among the
administrative and judicial systems at each level. The goals of this
principle are to keep any one governmental body from being over-
burdened,' and to provide for speedier claims resolution. 3 The
68. Catania, supra note 19, at 778.
69. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 99 (discussing specifically the Title VII administrative
process).
70. ZIMMER sr AL., supra note 14, at 950.
71. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 985 n.3.
72. Cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979) (Congress intended
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second principle is that the system should be understandable to un-
schooled litigants,74 since the initial filings and decisions are usu-
ally made before the aggrieved employee has the benefit of coun-
sel.' The third principle is that conciliation is favored over litiga-
tion, at least initially. 6 Congress, in enacting the procedural struc-
ture under Title VII, "wanted women and minorities on the job,
not languishing in the courts."'  The fourth principle is that, de-
spite the hope for a conciliatory resolution of grievances, Title VII
is ultimately enforced primarily by private litigants. To that end, a
complainant's right to be heard in a judicial forum shall not be
"to give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimi-
nation and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by victims of the discrim-
ination.").
73. See Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 920 (Pa. 1989)
(A statutory scheme allowing a plaintiff to avoid the administrative process "would result
in the very sort of burdensome, inefficient, time consuming, and expensive litigation that
the [administrative agency] was designed to avert."); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561
A.2d 179, 199 & n.12 (Md. 1989) (Adkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that the need for
multiple remedies is important to vindicate the policy against discrimination, and that the
need for the administrative process is due in part to the fact that it can be faster and less
expensive).
74. Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-27 (1972) (requiring filings with both
the state agency and EEOC is a procedural technicality, "particularly inappropriate in a
statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process");
Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 1971) (describing election of reme-
dies as an "overly technical judicial doctrine[]"). But cf Magini v. Otmorp, Ltd., 579
N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (App. Div. 1992) (noting that New York's antidiscrimination laws do
"not provide that a grievant have advice of counsel, or a full appreciation" of the statuto-
ry framework).
75. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1004-05 (noting evidence indicating
that, of 29 commonly encountered legal problems, those experiencing job discrimination
are by far the least likely to consult a lawyer).
76. See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that Congress
intended the EEOC to provide a discriminating employer with the opportunity to respond
to persuasion rather than coercion--"to soft words rather than the big stick of injunc-
tion"--and the initial resort to the administrative process allows an opportunity for concili-
ation), overruled by Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 647 F.2d 513 (5th
Cir. 1981); Major Charles B. Hemicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to
Litigation-How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 Mtt. L. REv. 1, 63
(1993) (noting that the 1964 Civil Rights Act institutionalized a preference for conciliation
by adopting a complex administrative complaint procedure geared toward administrative
remedies); Pamela A. Mann, Federalism Issues and Title VII: Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 414 (1984/85) (describing the purpose of
Title VII's initial resort to federal and state administrative bodies as increasing the possi-
bility of settlement).
77. The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1989) (statement of Lawrence
Lorber, Partner, Kelley, Drye and Warren).
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surrendered due to prior proceedings in the state or federal admin-
istrative system."8 The fifth principle, directly related to the previ-
ous two, is that employment discrimination law is ideally a two-
front battle: (1) to deter employers from engaging in discriminatory
practices and (2) to compensate victims of discrimination."9 A
significant way to accomplish both of these purposes is to provide
a complainant with a broad range of state and federal remedies for
discrimination, each supplementing the other."°
To these often divergent ends, Congress created a procedural
framework that has remained virtually unchanged since 1964. This
framework has both federal and state filing requirements and at-
tempts to balance the role of the EEOC in quickly resolving claims
without suit with the role of the courts in making the discrimina-
tion victim whole.
B. Administrative Prerequisites Under Federal Law
Contrary to ordinary administrative law principles, a person
alleging discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA,8
is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. In other words,
a claimant need not wait until the EEOC has concluded its investi-
gation of the claim before she or he files suit. Rather, a complain-
78. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (stating that
an EEOC finding that there was no reasonable cause to believe that a complainant was
discriminated against does not bar suit and de novo review by a federal judge).
1 79. See infra note 132 and accompanying text (stating a conception of the "ideal" em-
ployment discrimination policy).
80. It is this principle that makes the interplay between federal and state procedural
systems most significant. Since Congress never intended to have federal antidiscrimination
law preempt state law, but rather to have the two schemes compliment each other, provid-
ing ancillary relief, a complainant will often have to avail himself or herself of remedies
on both the federal and state level and, consequently, will have to meet the prerequisites
imposed on both levels. See BRADD N. SIEGEL & JOHN M. STEPHEN, OHIO EMPLOYMENT
PRAcrIcES LAW § 20.07(B) (1991) (stating that federal discrimination law has never been
interpreted to preempt state law except as state law permits a form of discrimination that
federal law prohibits); Catania, supra note 19, at 799 (noting that Congress intended Title
VII to provide a "threshold of protection," which would then be supplemented by state
law); Marjorie H. Gordon, Case Note, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.: Eviscerat-
ing Title VII, 17 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 987, 994-97 (1983) (discussing the legislative histo-
ry of the 1972 Title VII amendments, and noting that a House bill making Title VII the
exclusive remedy for employment discrimination was defeated in the Senate, which deter-
mined that the House bill was contrary to the original intent of the drafters of Title VII).
81. The basic Title VII procedures for enforcing its substantive rights are contained in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The ADA has expressly adopted the same procedures in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (Supp. V 1993), while the ADEA's procedures, distinct in some ways, are
functionally identical of the requirement to resort to, but not exhaust, administrative reme-
dies. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1988).
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ant under these statutes must satisfy two rather straightforward
prerequisites to be able to file a lawsuit: timely filing of a charge
with the EEOC and timely filing of a lawsuit after the EEOC
provides a "right to sue" letter or a notice of dismissal. 2 The
time limit for filing a charge with the EEOC depends on whether
the state in which the alleged discrimination took place has its own
administrative agency." If the alleged discriminatory practice oc-
curred in a state with such an agency-known as a "deferral"
state8 -the charge must be filed with the EEOC by the earlier of
300 days after the date the alleged violation took place, or thirty
days after the state agency dismissed the charge. 5 If the alleged
violation occurred in a state without an agency, the charge must be
filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the violation.86
After a charge is filed, the EEOC has a minimum of 180 days
to investigate, attempt conciliation, and determine whether to bring
a suit. 7 If the EEOC decides to bring a lawsuit, the complainant
loses his or her right to bring a private action. 8 If the EEOC de-
82. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 952. It is the latter prerequisite that most nota-
bly sets the ADEA apart from Title VII and the ADA. Under the ADEA, no right to sue
letter is necessary; a plaintiff must merely wait a minimum of 60 days after filing the
charge with the EEOC before suing in court. See generally JAMES B. HELMER & ANN
LUGBILL, REPRESENTING THE TERMINATED EMPLOYEE IN OIo § 2.2(C) (1990) (discussing
the principal differences between the ADEA and Title VII).
83. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing the broad categories of
state statutory schemes).
84. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 975-78.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Since deferral states are given 60 days of exclusive juris-
diction over a charge, and since a charge is not technically filed with the EEOC until
those 60 days have expired or the state agency has dismissed the charge, a complainant
must actually file the initial charge within 240 days to ensure the preservation of his or
her federal claim. See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 814 n.16 (1980).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); see also infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing
states with no fair employment practices agencies).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1995); General Tel. Co. v.
EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (referring to "the 180-day period of exclusive EEOC
administrative jurisdiction").
88. Although the language of Title VII itself only states that "[t]he person or persons
aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commis-
sion .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), courts "have unanimously ruled that, by negative
implication, this right of intervention is exclusive of any right to sue independently."
ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § T48.51 (2d ed.
Temp. Transfer Binder 1995); e.g., Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 697 F.2d 582,
583 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that Title VII "preclude[s] suits by individuals who are
charging parties, but who have not intervened in the pending EEOC action in their behalf,
once the EEOC action has been concluded by a consent decree"), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1041 (1984); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[I]f
the Commission sues first, individual employees are not permitted to sue independently
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termines that there is no reasonable cause to believe that discrim-
ination took place, it will provide the complainant with a notice of
dismissal, and the complainant may immediately file a lawsuit,
which will be tried de novo" If the EEOC fails to fully investi-
gate the claim within the 180 days, the complainant has two choic-
es. He or she may, at any time, request a "right to sue" letter,
enabling him or her to bring a lawsuit within ninety days of re-
ceiving the letter." He or she, by not requesting a letter, can also
allow the EEOC to continue investigating the charge and come to
some form of resolution. If the complainant remains dissatisfied, he
or she may still bring a lawsuit within ninety days after receiving
notice of the conclusion of the EEOC's proceedings, no matter
what the agency's final findings were.9'
C. Types of State Statutory Schemes and Their Impact
on the Title VII Framework.
Although the procedural framework set forth above seems clear
enough, it can be complicated considerably depending upon the
type of procedural framework a state legislature has adopted. Since
Title VII does not preempt state law,' and since Title VII pro-
vides for a sixty day deferral period to states with fair employment
practices (FEP) agencies, it is important to examine how the vai-
but may intervene .. ").
The ADEA, unlike Title VII, contains language expressly terminating a private right
of action if the EEOC brings a suit. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) ("[Tihe right of any
person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of such" employee under
this chapter.').
89. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844 (1976) (citing the "well-established"
rule that claimants have "the right to de novo consideration of their Title VII claims"
(emphasis in original)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.8 (1974)
("lAin individual's cause of action is not barred by a Commission finding of no reason-
able cause to believe that the Act has been violated.").
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); ZIMMER ErT AL, supra note 14, at 987.
91. ZIMMER Er AL., supra note 14, at 988.
92. See supra note 80 (discussing preemption). This is another major point of departure
from the ADEA. While it is generally true that state remedies for employment discrimina-
tion may parallel federal provisions as long as the state law does not conflict with federal
law, ZnmmER Er AL., supra note 14, at 982, the ADEA is an exception. The ADEA
states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any
State performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on
account of age except that upon commencement of action under this Act such action shall
supersede any State action." 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (emphasis added). Thus, while a com-
plainant may seek redress under a state age discrimination statute, he or she may not then
file a federal age discrimination claim without waiving the state claim.
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ous state procedures operate. This is especially true for complain-
ants asserting a right protected solely under state law, such as state
statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status,
sexual orientation, or having AIDS.93
Although there are many differences between state statutory
schemes as to the scope of coverage, procedural requirements, and
available remedies, they generally fall in one of three broad catego-
ries.94 The first category contains states that place no restriction
on a claimant's right to seek judicial redress directly; in other
words, states that do not require a claimant to file with or seek
redress from a state administrative agency. Under this broad head-
ing are two quite distinct subcategories.9" One subcategory con-
tains those states with no FEP agency at all, and thus not consid-
ered deferral states under Title VII.9 The other subcategory con-
tains states with election of remedies provisions, whereby a claim-
ant may seek redress from either the administrative agency or the
judicial forum, but not both.97
The second category contains states that require a waiting peri-
od after initial filing with a state FEP agency before commencing a
private action, but do not require complete exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. The statutory scheme closely resembles Title VII,
93. See generally 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 451:101-08 (providing state-by-state charts
of the types of prohibited discrimination).
94. See generally Catania, supra note 19, at 819-26 (discussing the three categories).
95. Actually, there is a third subcategory, where a complainant may elect between
judicial and administrative redress from the outset, but the complainant has the right to
trial de novo on the merits even if he or she opts for the administrative remedy. See,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2606(1) (West 1985) (providing for trial de novo);
id. §§ 37.2801, 37.2803 (allowing a complainant to seek direct judicial redress).
96. In this group of states, introduced supra note 85, a complainant must file any
federal claims initially with the EEOC within 180 days, and may file any and all state
claims directly with the court within the state's applicable statute of limitations.
97. Included in this category are, for example, New York, New Jersey, Ohio (for age
discrimination only), and the District of Columbia. See N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 297(9)
(McKinney 1993), NJ. STAT. ANN. 10:5-13 (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4101.17, 4112.05 (Baldwin 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2556(a) (1992); see also
Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that the state claim pre-
cluded the Title VII claim); Parker v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships, 697 F.
Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that the Title VII claim precluded the state claim); Ma-
rine Midland Bank v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 551 N.E.2d 558 (N.Y.
1989) (holding that when state agency dismisses a claim for administrative convenience,
the plaintiff may bring an action in state court); Balent v. National Revenue Corp., 638
N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ohio Ct. App.) (referring to Ohio's statutory scheme as a "legal hall
of mirrors"), appeal denied, 637 N.E.2d 12 (1994); supra notes 19-25 and accompanying
text (providing an illustration of how an election of remedies statute operates).
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and often follows Title VII procedures precisely. 9
The third category contains states that require complete exhaus-
tion of state administrative remedies, and provides some measure
of appellate court review. 99
Overall, one could think of an election of remedies scheme as
one that is partly a "category one" (no administrative requirement)
system and partly a "category three" (complete administrative ex-
haustion requirement) system, except, rather than having the state
legislature impose the system, the complainant chooses the system
best suited to his or her situation."°o However, as discussed in
part III, that argument hides a much less attractive reality.
PART III: CONCEPTS OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES AND THEIR
SHORTCOMINGS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Due to a variety of factors, many of which are noted in part I,
the current procedural mechanism for vindicating Title VII rights
seems to have broken down. Backlogs in the EEOC and state
administrative agencies are so great that the agencies rarely begin
investigations within their allotted time period. Consequently, ad-
ministrative agencies have failed to achieve one of their most im-
portant goals, which is speedy resolution of claims.' Meanwhile,
98. California, Connecticut, Florida, and Massachusetts are some of the states that
follow this type of scheme. For an example of how closely state frameworks in this
category mirror the language and procedures of Title VII, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-100 (text will be changing September 1, 1996) (West Supp. 1995), allowing a
plaintiff to file a civil action after timely filing a complaint with the state's FEP agency
and receiving a release, the equivalent to a right to sue letter, id. § 46a-101(b), allowing
a plaintiff to seek a release after 210 days from the date of filing with the FEP agency,
slightly longer than the 180-day Title VII period, and id. § 46a-101(e), requiring a plain-
tiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving the release, the same requirement as Title VII.
99. This scheme places the primary, if not the sole, adjudicatory function with the
administrative agency. Most of the states in this category provide for exclusive administra-
tive remedies, with limited judicial review. States in this category include, for example,
Georgia, New Mexico, Kansas, and Illinois. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-39(b)(5)
to -39(b)(6) (Michie 1990) (providing that the state court shall uphold the special master's
determination (who is appointed by the governor if the agency does not act on a com-
plaint within 90 days) unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion). But
see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1011 (1993) (providing for a trial de novo on the mer-
its, notwithstanding the requirement of exhaustion of remedies).
100. See infra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that may influ-
ence a claimant's choice of remedy).
101. See Aquino, supra note 40, at 15 (noting that the EEOC spends an average of 290
days processing each charge, far more than its 180-day period of exclusive jurisdiction).
The 290-day average far exceeds Title VII's requirement that the EEOC make a reason-
able cause determination "as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than
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the court system, the recipient of the agencies' overflow, has itself
seen an unprecedented rise in employment discrimination litiga-
tion. 2
In light of these developments, it is worth examining election
of remedies as a possible solution to some of these problems,
primarily for three reasons. First, it has been virtually ignored by
commentators searching for reform. Second, it is a system already
in place in some states. 3 Third, if the current majority in Con-
gress remains as committed (as it claims to be) to balancing the
federal budget, reforming the litigation system, and downsizing the
federal bureaucracy, it will be actively searching for mechanisms to
achieve these purposes. One potential reform proposal may include
reducing the funding, perhaps considerably, to the EEOC. Such a
proposal, although of modest cost-cutting value relative to the
overall deficit, would potentially be of great political value. An
analysis of election of remedies helps to reveal the danger in fol-
lowing such an approach.
Section A notes some of the more persuasive arguments sup-
porting election of remedies in light of the underlying theory be-
hind employment discrimination procedure. Section B looks at
some of the anomalous results the election of remedies system has
already created. Section C examines how an election of remedies
system, by splitting the function of the administrative and judicial
forums, is theoretically unsound. Finally, Section D looks at elec-
tion of remedies in light of another system also known as an elec-
tion of remedies system, arbitration.
The purpose of this discussion is twofold: (1) to argue that any
system premised upon driving a wedge between administrative and
judicial remedies is harmful to the vindication of employment
one hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
102. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (quantifying the increase in employ-
ment discrimination litigation).
103. In fact, the concept of election of remedies in the employment discrimination con-
text pre-dates Title VII. See, e.g., Bower Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.
1954) (upholding dismissal of plaintiff's judicial complaint after plaintiff first sought adju-
dication by defendant's System Board of Adjustment), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
In Bower, the Court of Appeals stated,
Whether we say that the party is bound by his own voluntary election between
an administrative and an alternative judicial remedy, ... or view this as an
application of the rationale of res judicata in a new area, we are satisfied that
the court should declare and enforce a rule of repose against the reexamination
of the merits of plaintiff's claim in this case.
Id. at 626.
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rights; and (2) to argue that the theoretical principles underlying
the current procedural system of employment discrimination law
are as valid now as they were when Title VII was enacted. Conse-
quently, any reform proposals for solving the employment discrimi-
nation crisis should be an extension or an alteration of the system
currently in place rather than a complete overhaul of that system.
A. The Case for Election of Remedies
Election of remedies, in its most general meaning, is the act of
choosing "one out of several means afforded by law for the redress
of an injury .... Doctrine provides that if two or more remedies
exist which are repugnant and inconsistent with each other, a party
will be bound if he has chosen one of them.""'' In the employ-
ment discrimination context, the idea of expanding the concept of
election of remedies to the federal procedural framework seems at
first to accomplish a great deal. Since both the EEOC and the
federal court system are unquestionably flooded with a growing
number of claims, and since every Title VII claim could potentially
pass through both the administrative and the judicial systems, the
notion of splitting the administrative function from the judicial
function is attractive. Moreover, it does not seem to run contrary to
the principle, embodied in Title VII and many other employment
discrimination laws, that the system's efficacy "depends primarily
on the willingness and ability of workers to bring private suits
challenging discriminatory employment practices."' 5 After all, un-
like a state system requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies,
where the ability to bring private suits at the state level is taken
away from the complainant, an election of remedies system pres-
ents the complainant with the option of avoiding the administrative
agency entirely. In short, it seems that the complainant would be
able to choose the method that best vindicates his or her rights."°
104. BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY 518 (6th ed. 1990).
105. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1023; see also Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) ("[Ihe private right of action remains an essential
means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII.... In such cases, the private liti-
gant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional
policy against discriminatory employment practices.").
106. Of course, there is only a true choice where a claimant is aware of the options
and the ramifications of such a choice. See Crisco v. Board of Educ., CA No. 9282,
1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120 at *7 (Aug. 29, 1988) ("An election of remedies occurs when
a party, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, pursues one of several inconsistent
remedies by some decisive act.") (citing Stoltz Realty Co. v. Raphael, 458 A.2d 21 (Del.
1983)); Ramirez v. Pecan Deluxe Candy Co., 839 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
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Since people in different situations will opt for different methods
of redress, this will balance the system, leaving two parallel
branches with independent, specialized purposes."°
Other possible justifications for expanding the election of reme-
dies concept to federal employment discrimination law do run
contrary to existing employment discrimination theory, but arguably
further some of the more popular criticisms of that theory. One of
the more appealing justifications is that it prevents complainants,
unhappy with the results in one forum, to get a "second bite at the
apple" in another.' Additionally, the administrative agency could
(stating that election of remedies applies only if the party made the choice with "a full
and clear understanding of the problem, facts, and remedies essential to the exercise of an
intelligent choice"). But see Magini v. Otnorp, Ltd., 579 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (App. Div.)
(holding that, in a State which requires election of remedies, a plaintiff alleging age dis-
crimination is barred from suit by his previous resort to the New York City's Commis-
sion on Human Rights), appeal denied, 599 N.E.2d 691 (1992). The Magini court rejected
plaintiff's argument that he was "unschooled, was without benefit of counsel, and his
knowledge of English is 'rudimentary."' Id. The court stated that,
there is no indication that the Legislature intended to import any
"knowledgeable" prerequisite for the election of remedies . . . to become valid.
The statute does not provide that a grievant have advice of counsel, or a full
appreciation of the finality of an election to proceed in the administrative fo-
rum. The policy of the statute is result oriented.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. This is the best rationale for the election of remedies structure that is apparent
from the little information available. There is staggeringly sparse legislative history avail-
able in any state that has implemented such a system. But see Marine Midland Bank v.
New York State Div. of Human Rights, 551 N.E.2d 558, 562-63 (N.Y. 1989) (determin-
ing that the administrative and judicial forums offer distinct advantages, and it should be
left up to the individual to choose); cf. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179,
199 (Md. 1989) (Adkins, J., dissenting) (noting that reasons exist for not wishing to sue
in court, such as a desire to remain with the employer or a desire to prevent "sensitive
and emotional" charges from being exposed to the public).
State courts that have looked at the coverage of election of remedies provisions have
also declined to examine the rationales and purposes of election of remedies schemes. See,
e.g., Balent v. National Revenue Corp., 638 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ohio CL App.) (declining
to "inquire into the wisdom of preserving a requirement of election in age discrimination
cases where none exists elsewhere"), appeal denied, 637 N.E.2d 12 (1994).
108. See Smith v. Gulf Oil Corp., 79 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. 1954) ("The purpose of the
doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent
double redress for a single wrong."); cf. BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1074 (2d ed. 1983) (asserting that allow-
ing a claimant with only a 20% chance of prevailing in a given forum to independently
assert the same claim in four forums, de novo, raised the chances of success to 60%);
Susan Hurt, Symposium Note, Res Judicata Effects of State Agency Decisions in Title VII
Actions, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 697 (1985) (articulating a broad concern over allowing
plaintiffs to pursue claims in a federal court when "a state level forum may already have
heard and decided the issues which would arise" due to questions of fairness and effi-
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provide a filtering function which it does not presently serve,
rejecting meritless claims before they bog down the entire sys-
tem.'1
9
B. Practical Problems Posed by Election of Remedies: A Look at
Preclusion
Although this proposal has a certain allure, there are some
fundamental and insurmountable problems with it. Specifically, the
concept of election of remedies produces two fundamentally prob-
lematic results. First, it is unduly discriminatory against pro se and
otherwise unschooled litigants. These are precisely the people
whom the procedural framework of employment discrimination law
was meant to help."' Second, far from achieving some type of
equilibrium between the administrative and judicial forums, election
of remedies ultimately encourages all complainants to forego the
administrative process entirely in favor of judicial action. Although
this potentially creates an even more burdensome situation for the
court system, many claimants--often those with less money-will
still opt for the less expensive administrative process. Generally
speaking, then, a person's income may be the determinative factor
in which forum he or she elects, a result that is unfair if one fo-
rum offers different remedies from the other. In addition, as the
potential traps built into the administrative process become more
widely known, the court system will remain flooded with employ-
ment discrimination claims.
The framework of Title VII and related employment discrimi-
nation laws has always been directed toward assisting those un-
schooled and untrained laypersons who, "unassisted by trained
lawyers, initiate the process.' By contrast, an election of reme-
dies system is, by many accounts, "a trap for the unwary and
unsophisticated.""' Instead of creating a system that efficiently
ciency).
109. Since a complainant under Title VII can currently get a trial de novo in federal
court irrespective of any adverse finding by the EEOC, the agency is not empowered to
filter out meritless claims. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
administrative procedures of the EEOC under Title VII).
110. See supra note 74 (noting that the procedure should be available to unschooled
litigants).
111. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1972); see also Donohue &
Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1023 ("The efficacy of Title VII and many other federal
employment discrimination laws depends primarily on the willingness and ability of work-
ers to bring private suits challenging discriminatory practices."); id. at 1023 n.126 (empha-
sizing the individual's role in Title VII enforcement).
112. HFLMER & LUGBILL, supra note 82, at § 2.3(B)(2)(a) (criticizing Ohio's election of
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and effectively fights employment discrimination, the requirement
to elect a remedy, even though that election is usually done with-
out the benefit of counsel and without a full understanding of the
ramifications of the supposed choice, adds further complexity to a
system already mired in procedural hurdles."' The emphasis has
shifted to one of strategy, with a greater "likelihood that an indi-
vidual who wishes to pursue a discrimination claim in federal court
will be precluded from doing so for reasons of form rather than
substance."',"
4
The greatest example of potential injustice to pro se litigants is
claim and issue preclusion, whereby a litigant who appeals and
loses a negative finding by a state administrative agency is preclud-
ed from asserting the same claims in a federal forum. In Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corp.," the Supreme Court determined
the preclusive effect in federal court of a state court decision re-
jecting an individual's employment discrimination claim under state
law. The case arose in the context of New York's election of
remedies scheme, a matter given little attention by the many critics
of the decision. In Kremer, the Court held that, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (the Full Faith and Credit Clause), such a state court deci-
sion bars a subsequent Title VII suit in federal court." 6 That
remedies scheme for age discrimination claims); see also Baker v. Siemens Energy &
Automation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (stating that the "interface
between the federal and Ohio state procedures for filing an age discrimination charge is a
minefield for the unwary litigant"); Marine Midland Bank v. New York State Div. of
Human Rights, 551 N.E.2d 558, 561 (N.Y. 1989) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority holding, strictly construing the New York election of remedies scheme, "creates a
trap for the unwary complainant"); cf. Bouker v. Cigna Corp., 847 F. Supp. 337, 340 &
n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (declaring that a pro se litigant "might not understand that he could
avoid the 'election of remedies' rule by filing an administrative charge with the EEOC
and waiting for the EEOC's automatic referral of the charge to the Division [of Human
Rights]," and would therefore be disadvantaged).
113. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that
the policy reflected in Title VII must not be frustrated by the development of the overly
technical judicial doctrine of election of remedies).
114. Mann, supra note 76, at 411.
115. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
116, Id. at 466-67. The Kremer decision and its impact on employment discrimination
claims has been thoroughly discussed and analyzed by many commentators, most of
whom have criticized the ruling. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the issue of pre-
clusion in too much depth here, except to demonstrate the inherent unfairness the decision
causes under state election of remedies structures.
Many articles discuss the impact of Kremer. See, e.g., LARSON & LARSON, supra
note 88, § T49.15(c)(3) ("The result reached by the majority in Kremer was unjust, not
only to Kremer himself but also to the spirit and intent of Title VII and the Court's
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decision's implications for election of remedies are enormous. Not
only is a complainant who elects an administrative remedy at the
state level barred from asserting a judicial action at the state level,
if that complainant is unfortunate enough to appeal a negative
administrative finding to the state appellate court and loses, the
complainant is also barred from asserting a similar federal cause of
action in the federal judicial system. Thus, contrary to the long-
accepted notion that a Title VII claimant gets a trial de novo in
federal court regardless of the outcome of administrative proceed-
ings,"' a claimant in an election of remedies context can elect
herself or himself out of the judicial process entirely." 8
earlier decisions. Title VII requires aggrieved persons to refer their charges to state agen-
cies and neither Title VII nor the Kremer Court provides for the appointment of counsel
prior to the filing of a suit in federal court."); Gordon, supra note 80 (concluding that
the Supreme Court misconstrued the language and legislative history of Title VII, and
misapplied the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Mann, supra note 76, at 430-31 (arguing
that the Kremer decision increased the likelihood that individual rights might be precluded
over issues of form, comity, and procedure, and that the notion that a state administrative
proceeding could limit a complainant's right to Title VII relief is misguided and contrary
to long-established precedent); Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Ad-
ministrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. LJ. 367, 369
(1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's "generous application of the preclusion doctrine"
undercuts the goals of civil rights laws generally).
117. WIuL.AM L. DIEDImCH, JR. & WILLIAM GAUS, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
CLAIMS § 9.18 (1982) ("The concurrent and independent nature of the various statutory
remedies for employment discrimination means that a Title VII claimant is entitled to a
trial de novo in federal court regardless of the outcome of prior administrative proceed-
ings." (footnote omitted)).
118. Until 1991, the election of remedies law in New York, which was the law at issue
in the Kremer case, was even less of a true election. Before 1991, a claimant who filed
a charge with the EEOC as required by Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, was consid-
ered to have elected an administrative remedy at the state level when the EEOC automati-
cally referred the charge to the state agency-despite the fact that the claimant herself
never filed with the state agency. Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, 943 F.2d 251,
257 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992).
The 1991 amendment of N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9) changed this. See N.Y. EXEC.
LAw § 297(9) (McKinney 1993) ("A complaint filed by the [EEOC] to comply with the
requirements of [federal antidiscrimination law] shall not constitute a filing of a complaint
within the meaning of this subdivision."). The amendment, however, left the anomalous
result that a claimant who files a charge with the state agency for the sole purpose of
complying with the ADEA requirements was held to have elected an administrative reme-
dy. See Bouker v. Cigna Corp., 847 F. Supp. 337, 339 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting the
"apparent anomaly" in New York law that a claimant filing with the state agency is
precluded from filing a court action while a claimant filing with the EEOC, who in turn
refers the charge. to the state agency, is not); see also Scopelliti v. Town of New Castle,
620 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (App. Div. 1994) (holding, under the amended New York statute,
that a claimant who filed with the state agency is barred from bringing a judicial action
on the same complaint).
Ohio law is the reverse. See Baker v. Siemens Energy & Automation, 838 F. Supp.
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The clear message of Kremer is that an individual who wishes
to preserve his right to assert a Title VII claim in federal court
should not seek state judicial review of an unfavorable agency
action."9 However, even this strategy does not guarantee that a
claimant will protect his or her federal claim. Circuit courts have
extended the Kremer preclusion principle to cases in which a
claimant, electing a state administrative remedy, initially prevails,
but later loses when the defendant employer appeals the administra-
tive decision and obtains a reversal. 2 Since "[b]oth Congress and
the courts envisioned state agency proceedings and remedies as
ancillary to federal administrative and judicial proceedings,"'' it
1227, 1231 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that a claimant who had previously filed an age
discrimination claim under OHto REV. CODE § 4101.17, which would normally bar a
subsequent filing with the state administrative agency, is not precluded from filing with
the agency for the sole purpose of satisfying the mandatory prerequisite to an action
under the ADEA). In dicta, the Baker Court explained,
Federal law requires that in order to have a judicial remedy in the district
courts, [a claimant] must first file with the OCRC [Ohio Civil Rights Commis-
sion] under section 4112.05. This filing, the Defendant argues, should make it
impossible for the Plaintiff to pursue pendant state claims under section 4101.17
or 4112.02(N). The practical effect of following this argument would be to
force the age discrimination claimant to elect between state and federal judicial
remedies. However, the Court finds this interpretation to be at odds with its
view that the interrelated enforcement scheme mandated by federal employment
law evinces a Congressional intent to create federal remedies which are comple-
mentary and supplemental to available state remedies for employment discrimi-
nation.
Id.
119. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 985.
120. E.g., Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1369 (9th Cir. 1985);
Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding, Inc., 741 F.2d 230, 232 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984);
Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984). It was precisely the
fear of this scenario that prompted Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent in Kremer, to
state, in addition to recommending that an unsuccessful state discrimination complainant
should not seek judicial review, that,
[i]ndeed, a prudent discrimination complainant may make every effort to prevent
that state agency from reaching a final decision. If the complainant prevails
after a full hearing, he runs the risk that his adversary may seek judicial re-
view. . . . For a complainant with some evidence to support his claim, the
wiser course might well be to thwart all state proceedings.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 504-05 n.18 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also LARSON & LARSON, supra note 88,
§ T49.15(c)(3) ("To preserve his Title VII rights, a plaintiff is required to initiate state
proceedings, but he must then make sure that he does not have the misfortune to pre-
vail."); Catania, supra note 19, at 837 (arguing that, since New York was an election of
remedies state, Kremer should have bypassed the state administrative scheme entirely).
121. Mann, supra note 76, at 418.
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is problematic that a state agency proceeding can indirectly serve
to terminate Title VII rights. Unlike state schemes that confer no
private right of action and thus make filing with the state adminis-
trative agencies unavoidable, election of remedies schemes are
perhaps more disturbing because, as the cases indicate, an un-
schooled litigant may forego the opportunity to assert rights that a
more savvy litigant-or an attorney-would not."
In short, an informed choice of remedies exists only for people
who know the ramifications of a particular decision." Apart
from disadvantaging uninformed litigants, 4 it also encourages
litigation over conciliation."z Anyone who is aware that an ad-
122. This is particularly disturbing in light of evidence that people experiencing job
discrimination are less likely to consult a lawyer than are people experiencing nearly all
other types of legal problems. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1004-05. Of
course, even the most savvy of litigants has fallen into the election of remedies trap. See,
e.g., Bouker v. Cigna Corp., 847 F. Supp. 337, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that an
attorney's filing of an administrative charge on the client's behalf constitutes an election
of remedies).
123. See LARSON & LARsON, supra note 88, § T49.15(c)(3) (arguing that, since Title
VII requires an administrative filing with a state agency, and since neither Title VII itself
nor the court in Kremer provides for the appointment of counsel prior to filing a federal
action, many pro se litigants, upon receiving an adverse determination from the state
agency and a notice of right to appeal, will likely file an appeal unaware that they may
be forfeiting their rights to a federal remedy).
124. A slight majority of states require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
appeal. Id. § T53.30. Thus, it could be argued that this system is even more unfair, be-
cause claimants could lose their federal right by doing what is required by Title VII and
state law. At least an election of remedies offers a complainant the initial choice of
whether to avoid the state administrative procedure entirely. However, it is perhaps more
disturbing that election of remedies falls unevenly on people who are not aware of the
way the system operates. Although both the "exhaustion" and "election" systems discour-
age legitimate appeals and encourage claimants to avoid state proceedings, an election of
remedies system has the further unfairness of its uneven application.
Moreover, an exhaustion of remedies system reflects some policy considerations that
would not be furthered by an election of remedies system. See Catania, supra note 19, at
828 (Catania notes that state exhaustion of remedies requirements reflect at least three
policy considerations: (1) conserving judicial resources by allowing the administrative
agency to narrow issues, dispose of meritless claims, and make initial determination of
merits, thus making the process more economical and expeditious; (2) strengthening the
administrative process by giving the agency the chance to develop the necessary back-
ground to make better determinations of cases; (3) forwarding the judicial desire to defer
to administrative autonomy.); see also infra notes 169-85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Judicial Conference's Long Range Planning Committee's proposal).
125. The New York court system alone has, through its incredibly strict interpretation of
election of remedies, done quite a bit to ensure that a claimant never even contemplates
an administrative filing. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. New York State Div. of Hu-
man Rights, 551 N.E.2d 558 (N.Y. 1989) (disallowing plaintiffs court case after plaintiff
filed an administrative complaint, even though the administrative filing was time barred
and the court filing was not).
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ministrative decision at the state level can ultimately bar a Title
VII claim at the federal level will be more apt to pursue a private
judicial action at both levels. This has two harmful effects. First,
since private litigation is more expensive to claimants on a case by
case basis than an administrative investigation, people with less
money are forced to choose between the "high stakes gamble"'"'
of private litigation and an administrative system that may ultimate-
ly foreclose the vindication of certain rights. Second, the idea of
encouraging everyone to litigate their claims is inefficient 27 and
runs contrary to the theoretical underpinnings of Title VIl's "de-
tailed administrative and judicial process designed to provide an
opportunity for nonjudicial and nonadversary resolution of
claims."'2
C. Election of Remedies and the Ideal Theory Behind Employ-
ment Discrimination Law: A Look at the 1991 Civil Rights Act
Perhaps the most pervasive criticism of the direction in which
employment discrimination law is presently heading is that it has
become "tortified," replacing a thoughtful balance between concilia-
tion and litigation with a purely adversarial system in which work-
ers and lawyers with questionable claims unabashedly pursue their
complaints in the judicial system with the hopes of winning a
considerable recovery. While commentators have tried to discern
the causes of this phenomena, none have looked specifically to the
concept of election of remedies.
Title VII, it has been argued, was founded on a somewhat
modified labor model of employment law.'29 The theory was that,
because discrimination is systemic and because the central purpose
of the law is to encourage employers to hire qualified employees
126. Berger, supra note 10, at 715.
127. See infra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the problems, in terms of
the efficiency of the statutory scheme, of allowing plaintiffs to sue without at least a
preliminary resort to the administrative process).
128. Great American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372-73
(1979).
129. See David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in THE
CivI. RIGHTS AcT OF 1991, at 12 (1993) ('"Title VII previously was structured on the
traditional labor model, with the emphasis on conciliation and the availability of equitable
relief only; the underlying theme was the preservation of employer-employee relations.").
See generally Hemicz, supra note 76 (criticizing the 1991 Civil Rights Act as represent-
ing a fundamental shift in employment discrimination theory, from one of remediation and
conciliation to one of litigation and damages).
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in the protected groups, the law should not, where possible, be ad-
versarial in nature. This ideal is borne out somewhat in the lan-
guage of Title VII itself, which emphasizes an initial resort to
"informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."'"3
Of course, since conciliation is not always possible, Title VII al-
lows for civil actions to force compliance with its provisions.'
As stated by John J. Donohue I and Peter Siegelman, the ideal
employment discrimination policy, then, "should generate the ap-
propriate volume and composition of litigation in order both to
provide an adequate deterrent for employers considering discrim-
inatory practices and to compensate victims of discrimination."'3
This two-front approach to discrimination, emphasizing conciliation
first, followed by litigation to force punishment for noncompliance,
has always been at the heart of employment discrimination poli-
cy. 13
3
An election of remedies system transforms the model into one
purely of litigation, certainly no less than has the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,13 which has been a primary target of recent
criticism. 35 The principal argument against the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, which amended Title VII to provide for compensatory and
punitive damages33 and jury trials, 37 is that it would encourage
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). This provision states that, "if the Commission determines
after [its initial] investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. It is only
upon the event that "the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission [that] the Commission may bring a
civil action." Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
131. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
132. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 984; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (stating that the trial court "has not merely the power
but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future" (footnote omitted)).
133. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing litigation and private
enforcement).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
135. See, e.g., Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 129, at 6 ("[The 1991 Act's] incor-
poration of civil jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages suggests that many
federal employment discrimination claims are likely to be resolved through ordinary civil
litigation. This may result in a diminished role for the [EEOC] and state fair employment
agencies."); Hernicz, supra note 76, at 2 (arguing that in the 1991 Civil Right Act, "Con-
gress has radically altered the evolution of employment discrimination law and thrust on
the courts the task of fostering its ill-conceived creation").
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b). The amount of compensatory and punitive damages available
for future losses, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of
enjoyment of life, are subject to a sliding scale of "damage caps" depending on the num-
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all alleged victims of discrimination to forego conciliation efforts
entirely in the hopes of recovering substantial damages, thereby
reducing the role of the EEOC and overburdening the court sys-
tem.13
8
The Civil Rights Act, however, contains a dual message in
keeping with the traditional policy justifications of employment
discrimination procedure. While the 1991 Act did provide for ex-
panded recovery, it also expressly encouraged the use of "alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotia-
tions . . ., mediation, factfmding, minitrials, and arbitration."'
139
This at least indicates that, regardless of the practical implications
of the Act," Congress saw the traditional policy underpinnings
of employment discrimination law--of conciliation and of the quick
resolution of claims-as having a continuing viability. Additionally,
the expansion of available remedies brought by the 1991 Act is
her of employees an employer has. See id. § 1981a(b)(3). In addition, compensatory and
punitive damages are limited to cases involving intentional discrimination. Id.
§ 1981a(a)(1). Claimants alleging "disparate impact" discrimination may not recover com-
pensatory or punitive damages. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (defining the ele-
ments of a disparate impact claim, which is most noteworthy for not requiring intentional
discrimination by the employer).
137. Id. § 1981a(c).
138. See supra note 135 (discussing recent criticism); see also Hernicz, supra note 76,
at 63. Hemicz comments on the testimony offered in opposition to the 1991 Act:
Next to the great "quota" dispute, damage awards for intentional discrimination
was the most hotly debated issue in the 1991 Act and the failed 1990 Act.
Opponents of expanded damage awards presented testimony that similar changes
in state discrimination laws had spurred plaintiffs' attorneys to file suits instead
of seeking conciliation and to refuse settlements in "hopes of a large jury ver-
dict, large punitive damage verdict, and a contingent fee coming into their
pocket." A spokesman for the National Foundation for the Study of Equal Em-
ployment Policies estimated that the cost of Title VII litigation would skyrocket
from 775 million dollars to over two billion dollars per year.
Hemicz, supra note 76, at 63 (citations omitted). Hernicz further states that "[m]ore trou-
bling than the anticipated increase in litigation costs, however, is the doctrinal genesis that
compensatory and punitive damages symbolize. . . . The 1991 Act vaults employment
discrimination law from this basic underpinning of conciliation into a litigation-oriented
system with tort-like damages." Id. at 63-64.
139. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1081 (amending § 2000e of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
140. Some have argued that the 1991 Act could enhance the possibility of alternate dis-
pute resolution. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 10, at 957 (noting that "Congress's encour-
agement of the use of ADR was undoubtedly influenced by . . . the current debate over
the so-called litigation explosion"); Berger, supra note 10, at 712 (arguing that the Act
evidences congressional approval of alternative dispute resolution and encourages the use
of procedures such as negotiation, mediation, fact finding, and minitrials).
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conceivably justified by providing adequate protection to victims of
some forms of discrimination,"' simplifying procedure," or fill-
ing gaps in state employment discrimination law." In short,
while the Civil Rights Act of 1991 can be seen as an attempt, and
perhaps even a failed attempt, to effectuate the policies of Title
VII," election of remedies is a wholehearted abandonment of
those policies.45
141. For example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), victims of
sexual harassment who were not fired, although covered under Title VII, seemed to be
left without an adequate federal remedy. See also Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 129,
at 11 (noting that the expansion of Title VII remedies now provides a monetary reward
for victims of sexual harassment not tied to lost compensation); Donohue, supra note 31,
at 1610 (arguing that the 1991 Act provides the first adequate remedy for sexual harass-
ment, and stating that Congress has "boldly advanced the law of sexual harassment").
142. Cf Belton, supra note 10, at 947, 957 (arguing that Congress attempted to harmo-
nize the scope of damages recoverable under all federal employment discrimination law,
but also noting that Congress "added yet another layer of complexity" by encouraging
alternative dispute resolution procedures).
143. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 129, at 11 (noting that the 1991 Act's
broader coverage will probably have the greatest impact in states that do not currently
provide comparable protection under state law).
144. But see id. at 12 ("The [1991] Act bases Title VII and the ADA on a tort model:
Employment disputes are to be resolved through litigation, with compensation to the vic-
tim and punishment for the offender."). See generally supra note 133 and accompanying
text (discussing employment discrimination policy).
145. See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1975) (arguing that the pur-
pose of Title VII, particularly the opportunity to end discrimination through conciliation,
would be frustrated if the EEOC could be avoided entirely), overruled by Burdine v.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 647 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1981); Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (Pa. 1973)
("[O]nly an administrative agency with broad remedial powers, exercising particular exper-
tise, could cope effectively with the pervasive problem of unlawful discrimination.").
For an analogous discussion on policy grounds, but applied to a state's statutory
scheme similar to Title VII, see Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d
917, 920 (Pa. 1989), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, referring to the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Commission [PHRC], argued that,
the statutory scheme would be frustrated if aggrieved employees were permitted
to circumvent the PHRC by simply filing claims in court. This would result in
the very sort of burdensome, inefficient, time consuming, and expensive litiga-
tion that the PHRC was designed to avert, and would substantially undermine
the proper role of the PHRC ...
The reasons the Legislature chose thus to postpone a complainant's
right to seek redress by an action in court are clear. The PHRC possesses a
"particular expertise" in the area of unlawful discrimination not possessed by
the courts. By requiring a complainant first to repair to the PHRC, the Legisla-
ture ensured maximum use of the PHRC's expertise, thereby minimizing the
inefficient use of judicial resources (and its attendant expense and embarrass-
ment of the parties).
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D. Arbitration: A Different Conception of Election of Remedies
In the employment discrimination context, the most common
usage of the term "election of remedies," as well as most of the
commentary on the concept, has been in the context of arbitra-
tion.'" Generally, the issue revolves around whether the resort of
a discrimination grievance to arbitration can preclude an employee
from concurrently or subsequently utilizing the statutory mechanism
of Title VII or its state equivalent to enforce the same grievance.
In light of two leading Supreme Court decisions, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. 47 and Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane
Corp.,"~ there has been much speculation as to the circumstances
under which contracts entered into between employers and employ-
ees can--or should-constitute the type of election of remedies that
would preclude the employee from litigating his or her employment
discrimination claims in federal court. The relative merits of apply-
ing the election of remedies doctrine to arbitration in the discrimi-
nation context have been assessed and analyzed by many commen-
tators.'49 The focus of this section is more narrow, however, and
146. See supra note 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing binding arbitration); see
also LARSON & LARSON, supra note 88, § T49.15 (in a three-part discussion of election
of remedies, one part is devoted to arbitration, one to the jurisdictional question of wheth-
er a Title VII claim can be filed in state court at all, and one to preclusion); SCHLE1 &
GROSSMAN, supra note 108, at 1075-91 (discussing election of remedies for 17 pages,
with 15 pages devoted to arbitration). See generally Belton, supra note 10, at 959-62 (dis-
cussing arbitration in light of the 1991 Civil Rights Act's embracing of alternative dispute
resolution); Berger, supra note 10, at 696-721 (evaluating the potential role of arbitration
in the employment discrimination context); Maria C. Whittaker, Gilmer v. Interstate: Liber-
al Policy Favoring Arbitration Trammels Policy Against Employment Discrimination, 56
ALB. L. REV. 273 (1992) (discussing the effect of Gilmer).
147. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that the prior resort to arbitration pursuant to a col-
lective bargaining agreement does not preclude a Title VII plaintiff from seeking a judi-
cial remedy).
148. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (upholding an agreement entered into by a plaintiff as a con-
dition of employment where the agreement requires that all disputes would be resolved by
arbitration, thus precluding plaintiffs ADEA suit).
149. Arbitration is a method of alternative dispute resolution in which parties voluntarily
submit their dispute to an impartial judge and agree that the decision rendered will be
binding. Arbitration has been the subject of considerable debate in the employment dis-
crimination context, particularly since the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. Most of
this criticism and praise has been aimed at the decision itself. See, e.g., Christine Godsil
Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1992) (criticizing the Gilmer
decision). Perhaps significantly, the Court gained some noteworthy praise from Senator
Robert Dole, now the Majority Leader in the U.S. Senate, see 137 CONG. REc. S15472,
S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991), who applauded both the 1991 Civil Rights Act general-
ly and the Supreme Court's apparent endorsement of alternative dispute resolution embod-
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has not been thoroughly analyzed by these commentators. In short,
the concept of election of remedies in the arbitration context, irre-
spective of whether it is a more justifiable application of the elec-
led in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing
the relevant provisions of the 1991 Act).
Since Gilmer, the debate has intensified, particularly as to the issue of whether an
employer can preclude all employees from ever asserting a federal discrimination claim in
court by inserting a boilerplate arbitration requirement in all employment contracts. In
part, this debate stems from an issue left open from the Gilmer court regarding whether
the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA], which mandates the submission of grievances to arbi-
tration, applies to employment contracts. Section 1 of the FAA expressly exempts "con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Conceivably, this exemp-
tion could be broad enough to reach all employment contracts. See, e.g., Whittaker, supra
note 146; Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the "Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolu-
tion of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbi-
tration Agreements Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REv. 435, 437-48
(1994). But see ZIMMR Er AL., supra note 14, at 981 (arguing that "more natural read-
ing" of the FAA exemption applies only to collective bargaining agreements--"classes" of
workers). The Court in Gilmer did not rule on this issue, both because it was not pre-
served for appeal and because the arbitration clause in that case was in a contract with
the New York Securities Exchange Commission, not with defendant. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
25 n.2. A further argument raised by some commentators is that Gilmer, decided under
the ADEA, should not extend to Title VII. See Hellekson, supra, at 435-57. But see
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying Gilmer to
Title VII).
Ironically, if Gilmer does apply to individual employment contracts under Title VII,
it would also apply to other statutes, such as the Old Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (Supp. V 1993), which imposes strict requirements for the
validity of a waiver of statutory rights. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text
(discussing the requirements for the waiver of rights under OWBPA). The Ninth Circuit
recently invalidated an arbitration clause on facts similar to those in Gilmer based on the
plaintiff's lack of knowledge of waiver. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42
F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. 1995). One of the rights
invoked by a widespread application of Gilmer would be a plaintiff's right to jury trial.
This argument has been brought in a case filed in January 1995 in the Northern District
of California. The suit alleges that an arbitration clause of the type the plaintiff in Gilmer
was required to sign is a violation of the Seventh Amendment, based on a state-action
theory. See Peter F. Blackman, Arbitration Suit Asserts Constitutional Arguments, NAT'L
LJ., Feb. 27, 1995, at Bl, B2 (discussing the recent case and presenting arguments on
both sides of the issue).
In addition to the battles over the scope of Gilmer, many commentators have
brought forth policy arguments for and against the widespread use of arbitration contracts.
Most of those arguments were addressed in Gilmer. See infra notes 150-54 and accom-
panying text (discussing the arguments in Gilmer). One argument not extensively ad-
dressed seems to be that employers may not be willing to require all employees to sign
employment contracts because that would bring the employees within the broad scope of
contract law.
State courts have imposed their own limitations on the preclusive effects of arbitra-
tion as well. See, e.g., Devine v. City of Des Moines, 366 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa 1985)
(holding that arbitration is inappropriate where administrative remedies are exclusive).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tion of remedies doctrine in employment discrimination law, is
fundamentally different from that in the administrative context.
Consequently, arbitration election of remedies does not evoke the
same types of practical and theoretical problems posed by the
"prior resort to administrative agency[-type]" election of remedies.
The arguments for and against the widespread use of arbitration as
a mechanism for resolving Title VII disputes are, therefore, not
identical to those for and against the concept of election of reme-
dies in the administrative context.
On one level, the primary distinction between the arbitration
election of remedies and the administrative election of remedies is
that the former is based squarely upon freedom of contract and
individual control over the prosecution of an action, two factors not
present in the latter. The Court in Gilmer, after rejecting arguments
that arbitration is contrary to the purposes of the statutory frame-
work '5 and that the procedures are inadequate,' distinguished
Alexander and other cases in the collective bargaining context
because of the "tension between collective representation and indi-
vidual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present
case." 15 2 While the plaintiff in Alexander had his grievance arbi-
trated under a clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement
that he had no part in drafting, the plaintiff in Gilmer actively
agreed to arbitrate all employer-employee disputes. Thus, the
Gilmer Court held that the individual agreement, and not the col-
lective bargaining agreement, served "to advance the [ADEA's]'53
objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the fo-
rum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise."'54
150. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-29 (rejecting arguments that arbitration is improper because
it prevents the ADEA's advancement of broad social policies, interferes with the EEOC's
enforcement of the statute, and deprives the plaintiff of a judicial forum). As to this last
argument, the Court noted that since the EEOC is mandated to pursue conciliation and
other informal processes, this "suggests that out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitra-
tion, is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress." Id. at 29.
151. Id. at 30-32 (rejecting arguments that arbitration panels would be biased toward
employers, that discovery is inadequate, that the results of arbitrators' findings would be
hidden from the public, and that remedies would be more restrictive).
152. Id. at 35.
153. Although the Gilmer holding only addressed rights under the ADEA, it has since
been made applicable to Title VII. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948
F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that Gilmer makes the Federal Arbitration Act
applicable to Title VII claims).
154. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)); cf. Polk County Secondary Rds. v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm'n, 468 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Md. 1992) (holding that an election of remedies require-
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A large part of the "freedom of contract" rationale is that con-
tracts are entered into knowingly and voluntarily, two conditions
absent from the administrative election of remedies context. In
exploring the circumstances under which an agreement to arbitrate
should preclude a subsequent judicial action under Title VII, one
commentator noted that such an agreement should reflect "a choice
made with full awareness of the nature of the claim as well as the
procedure which will be used to resolve it, and this should have a
bearing on the enforceability of the arbitration context."'55 Con-
gress seems to have advanced this goal with the passage of the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 56 which impos-
es extremely strict requirements for the unsupervised waiver of
ADEA "rights and claims" to be considered "knowing and volun-
tary."' Although the precise scope of this Act is not yet deter-
mined, it does indicate a concern that elections of remedies in the
arbitration context truly be elections based on full information. By
contrast, elections of remedies in the administrative context are
usually made by people without the benefit of counsel and without
any knowledge of the consequences. 8
ment is ineffective when a complainant is required to file with the state's FEP agency,
because "there is no choice to be made"). The logic here implies that when there is a
choice to be made, for example, when the state allows a plaintiff to elect between a
judicial and an administrative remedy, an agreement to arbitrate may be. enforceable in
some states. Thus, administrative election of remedies provisions, for better or worse,
could conceivably lead to an increase in instances of binding arbitration election of reme-
dies.
155. Berger, supra note 10, at 713 (arguing that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are
much less troubling, and should be enforced more often, than pre-dispute agreements); see
also supra note 106 and accompanying text (providing a "knowledge" requirement for the
enforceability of all election of remedies provision, but noting the lack of such a require-
ment in one state's administrative election of remedies framework).
156. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (Oct. 16, 1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(f) (Supp. V 1993)).
157. For a waiver of ADEA rights to be deemed voluntary, it must meet eight criteria:
(1) it must be in writing and in language calculated to be understood by the employee or
the average eligible individual; (2) it must refer specifically to rights and claims that arise
under the ADEA; (3) a waiver only applies to rights and claims that have already arisen,
not to future rights; (4) there must be consideration given; (5) the employee must be
advised, in writing, to consult with an attorney before signing the agreement; (6) the
employee must be given at least 21 days to consider the agreement; (7) the employee
must have at least seven days after signing the agreement to revoke it; and (8) if part of
an agreement offered to a group, the agreement must inform the employee of the right to
participate in the group action and the identity of all individuals also entitled to partic-
ipate. Id.
158. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing how pro se litigants are
disadvantaged by an overly technical election of remedies doctrine).
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Even if, however, the legislature in an election of remedies
state requires an employment discrimination complainant have "full
awareness" before choosing an administrative or a judicial forum,
there would still be a fundamental difference between such system
and an arbitration election of remedies system. In the arbitration
context, the so-called election of remedies is, arguably, merely an
election of forum, and not really an election of the type of reme-
dies available.'59 One commentator noted that while it may be
rational to conclude that an employee's agreement to arbitrate
waives his or her right to a judicial forum, "there is no basis ...
to conclude that [the employee] has also agreed to forego relief
otherwise available under the statute. Such an approach would raise
serious public policy concerns which might be sufficient to render
the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable. '' "W Ultimately, arbitration
election of remedies is concerned with preventing a windfall to
plaintiffs by prohibiting the possibility of double recovery.'6 ' By
contrast, an employee who is confronted with a choice between an
administrative and judicial forum must often truly make an election
of available remedies.'62 This is especially so when an election of
159. One potential exception to this assertion is the award of punitive damages. Courts
have held that arbitrators are allowed to award punitive damages in federal claims. See,
e.g., Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. M/T Triumph, 924 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991). Some states, however, do not allow punitive damage awards
in arbitration of state claims. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stewart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1976).
160. Berger, supra note 10, at 720 & n.173 (concluding that, if "arbitration is to be an
adequate substitute for litigation, it is necessary that the arbitrator's remedies parallel those
available to the courts"); see also James A. King Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on
EEOC Disputes, 9 LAB. LAW. 97, 103 (1993) (stating that social policy does not preclude
the waiver of one's right to a judicial forum); cf Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (stating that remedies available through arbitration will be ade-
quate and on par with those available under the ADEA, and that the EEOC may itself
bring an action to supplement any shortcomings an arbitrator may have in fashioning
equitable relief).
161. This is not the case with administrative election of remedies, which has at most
been concerned with preventing a plaintiff from getting two opportunities to recover once.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the prevention of double opportuni-
ties for recovery for a single wrong).
162. For example, the state fair employment practices agency in Ohio, the OCRC, may
grant only injunctive relief, reinstatement, promotion, and back pay. O-Ho REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.05(G) (Baldwin 1994). Compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable.
Crawford v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1986). In
contrast, for an age discrimination complainant who elects a judicial forum under
§ 4112.02(N) or § 4112.99, compensatory and punitive damages are available. Id. at 1190
(§ 4112.02(N)); Elek v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 573 N.E.2d 1056, 1058 (Ohio 1991)
(§ 4112.99); see also State Div. of Human Rights v. Luppino, 313 N.Y.S.2d 28, 32
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a state administrative forum serves to preclude a claimant from
subsequently litigating in a federal forum.163 The idea of making
only some statutory remedies available to a particular claimant runs
contrary to the purpose of the remedial scheme of employment
discrimination law, which allows concurrent remedies in an effort
to make victims of discrimination whole.'" 4
On a broader level, arbitration election of remedies is different
from administrative election of remedies because only the latter
fundamentally disrupts the procedural framework established under
Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes." Claim-
ants who elect arbitration, provided that it is a fully informed
choice, have simply taken their claims outside of the employment
discrimination framework entirely. By contrast, administrative elec-
tion of remedies drives a wedge between the administrative and,
judicial bodies and, by providing incentives for employees to pur-
sue the judicial remedy," s exacerbates the two interrelated prob-
lems with employment discrimination law today-that the EEOC is
ineffectual and that the court system is backlogged.
An election of remedies, as generally defined, presupposes
remedies that are "repugnant and inconsistent."'67 In the case of
arbitration, a person who contractually waives the statutory right to
(1970) (acknowledging the remedial distinctions between the courts and OCRC, while
asserting that without distinctions, there would be no point to having an election of reme-
dies system).
163. See supra notes 74, 111-28 and accompanying text (discussing preclusion of federal
claims). This would be especially troubling if the remedies available under Title VII were
greater than those afforded by state statutory law, which is increasingly possible in light
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining that
compensatory and punitive damages are available under Title VID.
164. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (stating that the funda-
mental objective in remedying Title VII violations-making the victims whole--"is shown
by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts with full equitable powers");
see also supra text accompanying note 79 (discussing ideal employment discrimination
policy).
165. In fact, not only does the arbitration system not disrupt the procedural framework,
it could be argued that it helps the framework operate more efficiently by taking some
claims out of the system entirely. In addition, it has been pointed out that arbitration
furthers other policy objectives of employment discrimination law, such as providing sup-
port for "unschooled" litigants. See Berger, supra note 10, at 717 (arguing that there are
no inherent disadvantages in arbitration's ability to adjudicate discrimination claims and
that, by offering lower cost and assistance of an arbitrator beyond that which a judge
could provide, there are advantages to claimants with less money).
166. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (discussing current complications
with the election of remedies system among state and federal judicial systems).
167. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY, supra note 104, at 518.
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litigate his or her Title VII claim arguably acts inconsistently with
the statutory right itself. By contrast, a person who elects to pursue
an administrative hearing is ultimately electing between two com-
plementary portions of a single remedy. In other words, to say that
someone who elects an administrative remedy can no longer file a
court action is to misinterpret the remedial scheme under Title VII.
PART IV: CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
THOUGHTS ON THE LONG RANGE PLANNING COMMITrEE'S
PROPOSAL, THE ROLE OF THE EEOC, AND THE FIRST STEPS TO
REFORM
The problem with the idea of election of remedies, apart from
the wildly unfair and anomalous results it helps produce, is that by
encouraging claimants to avoid administrative bodies entirely, it
splits the function of the administrative and judicial systems. Since
the necessary consequence of this or any similar proposal is to
reduce the effectiveness of the administrative body and to overload
the court system, it is fundamentally inconsistent with the way
employment discrimination law is supposed to operate. In fact,
many criticisms of the way employment discrimination law oper-
ates today are grounded primarily by the notion that the EEOC is
too weak to effectuate the policies of the antidiscrimination stat-
utes.'68
In light of this, the Judicial Conference's Long Range Planning
Committee's recent proposal, encouraging an expanded role for the
EEOC,'69 seems promising. 7' But it, like previous proposals "to
strengthen the law by strengthening the EEOC,'' 1 is incomplete
168. See, e.g., SPRiGGs, supra note 64, § 8.11, at 289 ("Generalizations about a large
agency's performance may be dangerous .... Nonetheless, some generalizations are clear,
and they are not complementary to EEOC .... EEOC is an agency both in disarray and
biased against those seeking to redress discrimination."); id. § 8.12, at 291 (noting that,
based on data from the EEOC Office of Program Operations, the EEOC never filed more
than 6.2% of civil suits in the federal courts); Berger, supra note 10, at 695 (arguing
that, because the EEOC has been inundated with claims, it "is in no position to speed the
resolution of employment discrimination disputes").
169. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text for specific proposals.
170. But see Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 26, at 1023 (arguing that the original
decision by the drafters of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prefer the courts over the admin-
istrative process as the primary enforcement body of Title VII was "sensible, in light of
the quarter century of failures by state and federal administrative agencies" (footnote omit-
ted)).
171. Gordon, supra note 80, at 994 (referring to the thinking in Congress behind the
1972 amendments to Title VII).
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and perhaps dangerous unless accompanied by a substantial in-
crease in funding. In one view, the EEOC has continually become
"stronger," as each expansion of employment discrimination rights
has conferred greater authority upon the EEOC. Without adequate
funding, however, a proposal such as the Long Range Planning
Committee's will inevitably lead to longer delays in the vindication
of rights. In addition, larger backlogs in administrative agencies
will occur"7 without the concurrent benefit of reducing the
judiciary's caseload.
The Long Range Planning Committee has, albeit belatedly,
apparently recognized the need for adequate EEOC funding. The
Committee's November 1994 draft of its Long Range Plan chastis-
ed the EEOC for according employment discrimination claims
"only cursory review before issuing 'right-to-sue' letters," and
called for "more careful administrative scrutiny."'73 The March
1995 version of the Long Range Plan addresses a more fundamen-
tal problem: funding. The Committee now attributes the EEOC's
cursory review of claims to "serious underfunding," and adds that
"[i]f the resources were provided for the kind of careful investiga-
tion, evaluation and conciliation originally contemplated by Con-
gress, the number of employment discrimination cases requiring
federal court action might be reduced."'7
Of course, an influx in resources is only useful if it is going to
pay for needed reforms. The Committee's proposal for reforming
employment discrimination law is essentially two-fold: first, to have
the EEOC conduct more thorough review of cases and to resolve
disputes where possible without resorting to the courts; second, to
have Congress give the EEOC power to adjudicate claims, and to
restrict judicial review of those determinations. 75 The first of
these proposals is not a departure from the EEOC's mandate'76 as
172. In fact, in response to the Long Range Planning Committee's proposal, an EEOC
spokesperson argued that the agency should issue "right to sue" letters earlier and more
frequently in order to alleviate its own backlog of cases. Judges' Report Seeks Major
Changes in Reforming Federal Court System, U.S.L.W. (Daily Ed.), Dec. 7, 1994.
173. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN (1994 Draft), supra note 6, at 28.
174. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 6, at 33.
175. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (referring to the language used in the
proposal).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to investigate charges and, upon deter-
mining that reasonable cause exists to believe that discrimination has occurred, to "en-
deavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." See also supra note 2 (outlining the EEOC's
responsibilities).
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much as it is a commentary on the EEOC's inability to fulfill that
mandate, caused in large part by the expansion of substantive
rights" and the agency's lack of funding. 7
The second proposal does represent a shift in employment
discrimination policy.'79 The court system has always been the
final arbiter of these statutory rights. This proposal, by adding a
quasi-judicial function to the EEOC's screening function, is more
like the exhaustion of remedies systems set up in many states, with
the same built-in advantages and disadvantages.' Among other
things, Congress would have to increase the EEOC's period of
exclusive jurisdiction, because very few investigations are complet-
ed within the current 180-day period.'' Because of the slowdown
such a system could create, perhaps people will be encouraged to
pursue alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration.' This
177. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional and
judicial expansion of employment discrimination rights).
178. See An Equal Opportunity Tune-Up, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 6, 1994,
at B8 (noting the EEOC Commissioner requested a 25% budget increase); cf. supra notes
42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the dramatic increase in employment discrimina-
tion cases).
179. See Silver, supra note 116 (stating that Congress designed the administrative pro-
cess, and its emphasis on less expensive and formal alternatives to litigation, to supple-
ment, not supplant, judicial causes of action).
180. As stated in ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 14, at 986-87,
Contrary to normal administrative law proposals . . . exhaustion of agency
remedies is not [presently] required, reflecting a congressional decision not to
subject private plantiffs to long delays that have always plagued the
Commission's charge processing. Nevertheless, it is still desirable that charging
parties willing to tolerate delay be permitted to exhaust EEOC processes be-
cause a court action might be thereby avoided through the agency's conciliatory
efforts.
See also Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 331 (1969) (arguing that
an exhaustion requirement "would only serve to prolong the deprivation of [a claimant's]
rights"); Catania, supra note 19, at 832 (arguing that any statutory scheme that requires
exhaustion of remedies will discourage claimants from bringing legitimate as well as ille-
gitimate claims).
181. See Aquino, supra note 40, at 15 (noting that the EEOC spends an average of 290
days processing each charge); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 100 n.50 ("Although the adminis-
trative process was designed to be a speedier alternative to litigation, this has not been
the case. The EEOC's administrative backlog is so great that the commission rarely com-
mences investigations within the 180-day period. ... ).
182. See Berger, supra note 10, at 696 ('To the extent that procedures [including arbi-
tration] other than traditional litigation can produce fair employment dispute dispositions
with lower cost and greater speed than the judicial system, common sense suggests that
they be used."); see also Durgin, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing the EEOC's trial media-
tion project, which has been successful in reducing the average time of resolution by
300% and increasing the settlement rate by 250%).
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brings another set of advantages and disadvantages.' Although
there has been some criticism of giving the EEOC expanded au-
thority,184 including from the EEOC itself,"5 there is some merit
to the idea of using the EEOC's fact-finding expertise in a judicial
capacity, at the expense of speed.
On a broader level, the Committee's recommendations point to
the fundamental questions of the need for and the role of the
EEOC. Ideally, the EEOC is the first tier of a two-tier system,
resolving as many claims as possible quickly and fairly. The court
system, the second tier, should be viewed as a last resort rather
than the forum where claims are ultimately and inevitably resolved.
Obviously, if more claims are resolved by the EEOC and thus
taken out of the system entirely, fewer cases will reach the courts.
As presently structured, however, the EEOC's ability to take cases
out of the system exists only when both sides agree to a settle-
ment.
Conceptually, the notion of election of remedies attempts to
keep cases out of the courts by giving claimants the choice of the
"tier" in which they wish to have their claims resolved. Even if
this were to result in a net decrease in administrative and judicial
filings, however, election of remedies does not serve the fairness
concerns inherent in the procedural framework of Title VII and
most state statutes. At the time the critical choice is made, most
claimants are not aware of the broad ramifications of choosing one
tier over another.'86 Even if claimants were informed of the possi-
ble preclusive effects of such a choice, and even if claimants were
told of any differences in available remedies, there is no way to
inform them of why one forum may be better than another under
183. Since it is generally agreed that arbitration is faster and less expensive than litiga-
tion, Berger, supra note 10, at 696, and also faster and probably less expensive than
exhaustion of remedies, see supra note 180, the remaining question is whether it is as
fair. See Berger, supra note 10, at 713 (noting critics' arguments that the system is unfair
since it favors defendants (the "repeat participators"), and judges and juries are not the
decision-makers, but concluding that there is no evidence that the system is unfair or
biased).
184. See, e.g., EEOC Should Not Be Given More Duties, Plaintiffs' Lawyers Tell Judi-
cial Panel, PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA), Jan. 2, 1995, at 15 (reporting the testimony of
the National Employment Lawyers Association, which argues that the EEOC should not
be given more power, because this approach has "been unworkable before and will be un-
workable now").
185. See supra note 172 (noting an instance of EEOC self-criticism).
186. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the policy inherent in
Title VII of making the procedural framework understandable to untrained litigants, most
of whom are not represented by counsel).
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the specific circumstances of their case.
If the Title VII procedural framework accomplishes nothing
else, it puts this decision off until there is enough available infor-
mation, and it does not force a claimant to make the decision
alone. Once 180 days elapse after a claimant files her or his
charge with the EEOC, assuming it is not resolved, the claimant
faces a choice similar to that envisioned by an election of remedies
scheme. The claimant may allow the agency to continue investigat-
ing the claim, or she or he may request a right to sue letter and
take the case to court.
Although this scenario is, in one sense, an "election of reme-
dies," it differs in at least three significant ways from the system
that is the focus of this Note. First, the decision happens later in
the process. Second, the decision is not absolute. For instance, a
decision to allow the EEOC to continue its investigation does not
compromise the claimant's-or the defendant's-right to de novo
court review. The decision is not inconsequential, however. If a
claimant decides, after 180 days, to request a right to sue letter,
the EEOC's investigation almost always ends."7 Third, and
relatedly, the decision is not the claimant's alone.
These critical differences in Title VII's procedural framework
recognize that employment discrimination is complex, calling for
case-specific solutions. Sometimes it is appropriate to punish the
discriminator and compensate the victim, while other times it is
more fair and effective to simply resolve a misunderstanding or
correct a systemic barrier. Title VII's framework also recognizes
that employment discrimination is a major societal problem, and
that individual claimants are not necessarily the best people to
decide how to combat it.'88 Title VII's framework, by assigning
complementary roles to the EEOC and the court system, reflects
these concerns in a way an election of remedies system does not.
Although it is procedurally very complex, that complexity provides
flexibility. Title VII is structured in a way that the merits of a
claim are heard, rather than having procedural or strategic concerns
govern a case.
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) (1995).
188. See Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal
Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482, 519 (1987) ("[T]he procedure that
might be preferred by a given complainant[] might not be preferred by the respondent, or
the agency, or-to the extent it can be ascertained-the public.").
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While the existing Title VII framework avoids many pitfalls of
election of remedies, the framework can still be streamlined. Rather
than allowing claimants the choice of whether to skip the adminis-
trative tier, we should be focusing on how to achieve the primary
goals of election of remedies-simplicity and speed-within the
existing framework. The EEOC must formulate a clear mandate,
with an emphasis on preventing cases from ever reaching the court
system. One potential approach may be for the EEOC to distin-
guish among types of claims, determining at the outset which cases
are more appropriate for judicial resolution.'89 Assuming that
claims involving compensatory and punitive damages-claims
aimed at punishing the discriminator and compensating the vic-
tim-are better resolved by the court system, perhaps the EEOC
should investigate these claims only to the point of making a "rea-
sonable cause" determination. In addition, the agency should limit
itself to this initial determination in cases involving statutory inter-
pretation or other cases in which court precedent will help deter-
mine the outcome of future cases. If the EEOC finds reasonable
cause to believe discrimination has occurred, it should automatical-
ly issue a right to sue letter or, in the case of a claimant without
the means to afford a court action, should bring a court claim
itself. If it finds the claim to be frivolous, it should dismiss the
claim, and Title VII should be amended so as to give preclusive
effect to this finding. If the EEOC is given more authority to make
this initial determination, fewer cases will reach the courts."9
Meanwhile, by automatically issuing right to sue letters in all meri-
torious claims of intentional discrimination, the EEOC can focus
more closely on systemic discrimination claims, and on conflict
resolution generally. This approach would reconcile the need for
speed of adjudication and the recognition that different types of
situations call for different types of solutions; at least, it would do
so better than an election of remedies system or a system requiring
189. This mandate has, arguably, existed since the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which
granted the EEOC the authority to litigate claims. See id. at 511 ("The 1972 changes
were intended to place the decisionmaking authority as to whether to proceed to litigation
within the hands of the agency with the expertise on employment discrimination.").
190. In fact, if the EEOC is given the power to dismiss frivolous claims entirely, the
number of court cases may be reduced quite significantly. Of the 68,366 cases the EEOC
resolved in 1993, 61% were resolved by a finding of no reasonable cause. Michael
Mankes, Comment, Combatting Individual Employment Discrimination in the United States
and Great Britain: A Novel Remedial Approach, 16 CoMP. LAB. LJ. 67, 72 n.34 (1994)
(citing EEOC OFFICE OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT app. 2 (1993)).
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all claims to be heard by an arbitrator.
Of course, this approach addresses only half the problem. The
other half is that the EEOC itself is increasingly overwhelmed with
claims. Unless society supports scaling back the protections avail-
able under the substantive discrimination statutes, the EEOC needs
an influx of resources to fulfill its mandate. Commentators are
quick to identify the EEOC's failures, but rarely note that the
EEOC's individual agents are resolving claims at record rates.19" '
In other words, it is possible that the agency is failing while the
agents are not. If that is the case, an increase in resources for more
agents is worthwhile.
We are living in a time, however, where a prime concern on
Congress's collective mind is balancing the federal budget. At the
game time, both the federal judiciary 92 and the EEOC' are
calling for reductions in their responsibilities due to backlog. In
this environment, it is and will continue to be tempting to look at
procedural schemes where claimants who take their discrimination
claims to one forum are precluded from taking them to another.
Such a procedural system would be a mistake, creating unfair-
ness without streamlining adjudication. Instead, the first step to
strengthening the operation of employment discrimination law is to,
again, strengthen the EEOC. Unlike similar past proposals, howev-
er, the key lies in the Ways and Means Committee. The EEOC's
budgets and staffing have remained frozen for the last decade,
during the heart of the litigation explosion. The 1995 EEOC bud-
get is approximately $233 million, a $3 million increase over the
1994 budget, but a $13 million less than the amount requested for
1995 by the President.9 4 The new Chair of the EEOC has re-
quested a 25% increase, or an increase of less than 0.001% of the
GDP." 5 Even if such an increase is not forthcoming from Con-
191. Mankes, supra note 190, at 78 n.70 (citing EEOC OFFICE OF PROGRAM OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 190, at 3).
192. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing the Committee on Long
Range Planning's proposal).
193. See supra note 172 (noting that an increase in the issuance of right to sue letters
will lead to a decrease in the litigating responsibilities of the EEOC).
194. EEOC, Substantial Increase in EEOC Budget Not Expected to Survive GOP Con-
gress, DAILY REP. FOR EXEc., Feb. 8, 1995, at B26.
195. The United States' Gross Domestic Product in 1993 was $6.343 trillion. THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1995, at 112 (Robert Fanighetti ed., 1994). The
increase proposed by the EEOC Chair is approximately $58 million (25% of $233 mil-
lion), An Equal Opportunity Tune-Up, supra note 178, at B8, or less than 0.001% of the
GDP.
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gress, we should actively search for alternate sources of funding.
For example, Congress could alter Title VII to provide that a set
percentage of all punitive damages awards under the statute be
given to the EEOC. Such an approach would be consistent with
the deterrent and punishment rationales of punitive damage awards,
while maintaining the incentive for attorneys to bring claims. Con-
gress could enhance the revenue-generating potential of such an
approach by removing or adjusting the damages caps available
under Title VII.
Overall, increased funding is not the ultimate solution to the
EEOC's problems, but it could be the first and largest step toward
emerging from the existing crisis in employment discrimination
law. If that is the case, it will be well worth the investment.
DAVID C. BELT

